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DEVOLUTION
In 1998 there were elections for the Northern Ireland Assembly;
in 1999 there were elections for the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish
Parliament; in 2000 Ken Livingstone was elected as the first directly
elected mayor for London; and in 1999 eight Regional Development
Agencies were established in England. The UK entered the year
2000 with four governments instead of one and a unitary system
gave way to a messy quasi-federal set-up. However, much was unstable
at the same time as the peace process in Northern Ireland and
the 'English question' - how England should be governed in a devolved
UK - were not the only matters that were left unresolved.
So, where are we now on devolution
and what are the key issues that have pushed to the fore?
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SCOTLAND
The new politics in Scotland has
not been without pettiness (the initial squabble over office support
for MSPs); scandal (the so-called 'Lobbygate' affair with the
suggestion that a prominent firm of lobbyists was improperly influencing
ministers); and three good old-fashioned independent MSPs (Tommy
Sheridan, the ex-poll tax campaigner, won a seat in the Glasgow
region for the Scottish Socialist Party; Robin Harper won a seat
for the Green Party in the Lothians region; and Dennis Canavan,
having failed to win a place on the official Labour candidate
list, beat the New Labour candidate by a mile in his old Westminster
seat of Falkirk West).
Coalition and university tuition
fees
The 1999 election for the Scottish Parliament produced a hung
parliament. Labour entered into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats.
Donald Dewar became First Minister and Jim Wallace, the leader
of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, was his Deputy and one of just
two Liberal Democrat ministers in the eleven strong Scottish Executive.
It was always going to be the case
that university tuition fees would be a bone of contention between
the coalition partners. The Liberal Democrats entered the election
strongly pledged to abolish them but Labour wanted to maintain
them and was very reluctant to go against a policy of the UK government
knowing that it could have expensive knock-on repercussions south
of the border. To help get Labour off the hook A Committee of
Inquiry into Student Finance was established under Andrew Cubie
and his recommendations have been largely implemented.
So, consider yourself lucky if you
were born in Scotland and plan to study at a Scottish university
because fees have been abolished from autumn 2000. True, students
will have to pay into a graduate endowment once they have started
to earn a 'significant' income after graduating. However, this
will be about a third less than tuition fees elsewhere in the
UK and will be easier to pay than the up-front lump-sum fee being
paid by those of you south of the border. More than this, from
2001 non-repayable cost of living bursaries, to a maximum of £2,000
a year, will be available to young students from poor families
in Scotland, and about 30,000 mature students entering higher
education will benefit from discretionary bursaries.
The death of Donald Dewar and
long-term care
Donald Dewar died in October 2000. Fifty three Labour MSPs and
twenty seven members of the party's Scottish Executive elected
Henry McLeish as party leader and First Minister of Scotland.
Dewar, an ex-Cabinet minister and long-time Westminster MP, had
served as a crucial bridge between the old unitary UK and the
new devolved system so that open conflict between Holyrood and
Westminster had been 'managed' and almost non-existent. At the
time of his death, one senior Labour MP was reported as saying,
'Donald's death is going to have a huge impact on the relationship
between Edinburgh and London.' In bald terms, the New First minister
has had to adopt a more nationalistic tone and that means being
prepared to be less 'on message' with New Labour in London. McLeish
faced his first test on the issue of the funding of long-term
care.
In December 1997 the Labour Government
set up a Royal Commission on long-term care under Sir Stewart
Sutherland. The Commission reported in March 2000 and recommended
that all long-term care should be free. Westminster ruled this
out on grounds of cost and said that only nursing care should
be free. Initially the Scottish Executive looked set to follow
the Westminster line. When McLeish took office he made the Sutherland
Report a key plank of his new administration, claiming that he
wanted to 'move forward' on it, which most interpreted as Scotland
going it alone and introducing free nursing and personal care.
There has been much talk of McLeish
coming under pressure from Blair and Brown in Westminster who
are both anxious that Scotland should not have a different policy
from England in the run-up to a general election. The Guardian
reported that 'McLeish has been subtly playing down the whole
issue. He has consistently denied he ever said he would implement
the report in full'. However, the Liberal Democrats in the coalition
continue to press the case for free personal care. In order to
avoid losing a vote in the Scottish Parliament, the Executive
had to state its commitment to the Sutherland proposals and set
up a development group to report by August 2001 on how to implement
them.
The 'tartan tax'
Not surprisingly, commentators are beginning to wonder whether
the 'tartan tax' (the Scottish Parliament can 'vary' income tax
by up to 3p in the pound on the basic rate, unlike the Welsh Assembly)
will have to be levied in order to pay for Sutherland; university
tuition fees; and other commitments such as the 23% increase in
teachers pay over next 3 years.
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WALES
Devolution in Wales seems to have
been dominated by resignations. Ron Davies, the main architect
of the 1997 Act, resigned as the party leader in July 1999 following
his 'moment of madness' on Clapham Common; Alun Michael, his successor
and the Blairite leader of the Labour minority government, was
forced to resign on a 'no confidence' vote in the Welsh Assembly
in February 2000; Rod Richards, the leader of the Welsh Conservatives,
resigned in August 1999 following a charge of serious bodily harm;
and Dafydd Wigley, the veteran Plaid Cymru leader, resigned in
August 2000 because of ill-health.
From minority government to coalition
Labour failed to win sufficient seats in the Welsh Assembly to
form a majority government, but instead of entering into a coalition
it chose to go it alone as a minority government. Following the
resignation of Alun Michael (seen by some as an 'imposition of
London rule'), the new leader of Welsh labour, Rhodri Morgan,
tried a different tack and there emerged 'what might be described
as a more continental-style informal cohabitation between Rhodri
Morgan's administration and Plaid Cymru.'
Rhodri Morgan's informal accommodation
with Plaid Cymru did not put a stop the turbulence and instability.
In October 2000, and after months of private negotiations, Labour
and the Liberal Democrats announced that they were forming a coalition
government along the lines of the similar partnership administration
in Scotland. The three year deal gave the Liberal Democrats two
seats on the six strong Welsh Executive. Labour was forced to
concede an inquiry into higher education funding in Wales; has
agreed to free eye tests and free dental checks and prescription
charges for under 25s; and will establish a review to look at
the case for proportional representation for local government
in Wales.
Jobs crisis and the development
of the Welsh Assembly
In early 2001, Corus announced the loss of more than 2,500 steel
jobs. This was seen as 'the first major policy crisis' for the
devolved government but there was little it could do about it.
A package of £20m to persuade the company to stave of its closure
programme was as of nothing against the £226m loss the company
made in the first half of the financial year. It was a bruising
lesson about power: devolution might enable more decisions to
be taken by elected politicians in Wales but those politicians
might not be able to touch the onward march of global economic
forces.
A recent study by the Institute of
Welsh Affairs, Inclusive Government and Party Management,
suggested that the National Assembly for Wales is 'moving in the
direction of becoming a parliamentary body and away from the local
government model laid down in the 1997 Wales Act'. But in The
State and the Nations, Robert Hazell argues that 'the Welsh
Assembly can show few tangible achievements for its first year
of operation, apart from ditching its Blairite First Secretary.'
Hazell recognises that the limitations of Welsh devolution might
have much to do with the limited powers provided by the initial
legislation. This being the case it is not too surprising that
when the Assembly's Operational Review got underway in January
2001 it quickly focused on this issue and the Assembly's 'right'
to have the kind of substantial legislative powers enjoyed by
Scotland.
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NORTHERN IRELAND
Rival constitutional futures
The conflict in Northern Ireland revolves around its constitutional
future: is it to stay in union with Great Britain or does its
future lie with the Irish Republic? However, within the tighter
confines of the Belfast Agreement of 1998, the issue, and the
stumbling block in the way of anything approaching stable devolved
'power-sharing' government, continues to centre on arms decommissioning
by the IRA.
Arms decommissioning
Unionists see decommissioning as the tangible embodiment of a
Nationalist commitment to the ballot box over the bullet; as a
tacit Republican acceptance of the Union; and as nose in the dirt
surrender. Many Nationalists also see decommissioning as a raw
surrender and as a denial of their 'right' to continue to fight
for union with the Irish Republic. That said, both sides cannot
help but recognise that it has been violence, and the public desire
to escape still more violence, that brought about the Belfast
Agreement and that somehow keeps an awkward 'peace process' alive,
if not kicking.
The on-off-on of devolved government
Following the Assembly elections of June 1998 there were many
months of on-off inter-party negotiations on the implementation
of the Agreement before it became apparent that devolution could
proceed. The Assembly eventually met in November 1999 and this
enabled the four parties to the Executive (Ulster Unionist Party,
Social Democratic and Labour Party, Democratic Unionist Party,
and Sinn Fein) to nominate their ministerial choices and select
their chosen departments. The Executive met for the first time
in December 1999, but minus its two 'no to the Agreement' Democratic
Unionist Party ministers.
The Belfast Agreement called for
decommissioning by 22 May 2000 but it did not set a start date.
First Minister David Trimble, always under pressure from the 'no'
Unionists within and without his own Ulster Unionist Party, made
it very clear that he would resign if the decommissioning process
did not start by 12 February 2000. This produced what the new
(and now resigned) Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Mandelson,
referred to as a 'devolution-decommissioning stalemate' and he
suspended devolved government after just 72 days rather than wait
for Trimble's resignation.
Following hectic rounds of negotiation
and talks between all sides, Prime Minister Tony Blair on 5 May
announced at Hillsborough Castle that he would be prepared to
restore devolved government on 22 May. But he would only do so
if the IRA made a commitment to getting rid of its guns. There
was the further suggestion that the real deadline for decommissioning
(what was euphemistically referred to as the 'full implementation
of the Good Friday Agreement') would be put back a year to June
2001. The Prime Minister also indicated that the government would
seek to 'normalise' security in Northern Ireland, a placating
response to the long-standing republican concern to see 'Troops
Out' and 'demilitarisation'.
On 6 May the IRA issued a statement
which committed the organisation to initiating a process of putting
arms 'beyond use'. It would re-engage with the de Chastelain Independent
International Commission on Decommissioning and 'within weeks'
it would allow 'a number' of its arms dumps to be inspected by
international third parties as a 'confidence building measure'.
Because this was seen as 'a first step' towards full decommissioning
it was just about enough to enable Trimble to sell the deal to
his bitterly divided party. Devolved government was restored but
the decommissioning issue has not gone away. It has been finessed
and put off, again. Expect to see another crisis this June but
do not expect to see a handover of IRA weapons - ever.
Ugly realities behind the peace
process
Behind the peace process, the power-sharing, and the symbolic
and bizarre politics of flowers, flags, parades and marches, and
the correct name (and badge) for any new police service there
exists a far harder reality. A 'No Surrender' Real IRA (the organisation
widely suspected of having planted the Omagh bomb which killed
29 and injured 200) is prepared to continue to bomb its way to
a united Ireland and may well attract the active support of hard-liners
in the Provisional IRA if there is ever to be real decommissioning.
One commentator has noted how 'the organised, selective and high-level
violence of the "pre-ceasfire" period has been replaced, "post
ceasefire', by disorganised, diffuse and low-level violence' involving
sectarian attacks', principally perpetrated by loyalists on Catholics
living in the 'wrong' place. Moreover, the early release of 'political'
prisoners has thrown the links between paramilitaries and organised
crime into sharp focus. The UDA and the UVF have been trading
accusations of involvement in drugs and extortion, naming names,
at the same time as criminal gangs linked to republican paramilitaries
have been involved in the illegal cross-border trade in livestock.
The trend to extremism
In Northern Ireland there is the grinding struggle between the
rival and seemingly irreconcilable traditions of Unionism and
Nationalism, Protestantism and Catholicism. There are low levels
of trust and both traditions are desperate to avoid getting 'locked
in' to any kind of political process which they cannot control
and from which they cannot escape. There are also intense rivalries
within the traditions between moderates and extremists, with politics
always seeming to gravitate towards the extremes. These rivalries
may well unfold in ways with profound implications for the viability
of the Belfast Agreement. For example, in the coming General Election
in June will Trimble's Ulster Unionist Party face electoral meltdown
and will Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party emerge as the
strongest protestant force in Westminster? And will Sinn Fein
finally overtake John Hume's Social Democratic and Labour Party
as the largest nationalist party in the electorate?
The future: direct rule or a united
Ireland?
Devolved government in Northern Ireland is a problematic 'involuntary
coalition' between four parties where there is no tradition of
collective responsibility on the part of a divided executive and
where everything is on a constant crisis knife-edge. In these
circumstances is a return to direct rule a possibility and, in
the longer term, is a United Ireland on the cards? Catholics may
already account for more than 46% of the population, with the
Protestant majority predicted to 'fall sharply' once this year's
Census figures are revealed.
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ENGLISH REGIONS
New Labour
New Labour's 1997 election manifesto promised to move 'in time'
to directly elected regional government for those areas in England
that voted for it in a referendum. No referendums have yet taken
place. The government is divided on the whole issue and although
Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott (and now Chancellor of the
Exchequer Gordon Brown) are both keen, the Prime Minister Tony
Blair has been decidedly cool.
The Conservatives
The regional issue and the 'West Lothian Question' (see British
Politics p.328) have both been taken up by the Conservatives
who, lacking much of a base in Wales or Scotland, press the case
for 'English votes on English laws' in the hope of garnering the
vote of English nationalists. That said, few Conservatives press
the case for a fully-fledged English Parliament although many
advocate excluding Scottish MPs from the conduct of English (and
Welsh) business in the House of Commons, thus using that chamber
as a proxy English parliament. But beyond that, most Conservatives
are not fans of regional government seeing it as a step on the
road to a federalised 'Europe of the regions' and in their mini-manifesto
Believing in Britain they advocate the abolition of Regional
Development Agencies and Regional Assemblies with 'their powers
and budgets … given back to local authorities.'
Campaigns
There has been a robust campaign for regional government from
the North-East, provocatively (?) backed by Hartlepool MP and
now backbencher Peter Mandelson. Similar campaigns have begun
to occur in other regions and in 1999 this prompted the formation
of the Campaign for the English Regions. This is a national umbrella
organisation designed to link the separate regional campaigns
and with a brief 'to secure a commitment in the manifesto of the
Labour Party and the other main parties to allow referendums on
directly elected and representative regional governments in England
in the term of the next parliament.' However, campaigns are less
well-developed in a number of English regions and the South-East,
Eastern Region, and East Midlands have yet to move on the issue.
In the South-West, Cornish Nationalists want to exclude their
county from any South-West regional assembly. They hope instead
for a proper Cornish Parliament, with some urging that debates
be conducted in the Cornish language which could be something
of a problem since the last native-speaker died some years ago.
A regional hotch-potch
As things currently stand there has been the piecemeal development
of a hotch-potch of Regional Development Agencies; voluntary Regional
Chambers (which some regional 'constitutional conventions' want
to see directly elected and re-badged as Regional Assemblies);
and Government Offices of the Regions that were set up by the
Conservatives in 1994. Some doubt whether RDAs have the powers
and resources necessary to act as effective promoters of development
in the regions; few think that the RCs have 'yet borne a great
deal of visible fruit'; and how much public steam is there behind
the regional campaigns for devolved assemblies along the lines
of the National Assembly for Wales?
Local government or regional government?
London has a directly elected mayor and under the Local Government
Act 2000 all local authorities are obliged to develop proposals
to bring in a directly elected mayor; a cabinet and a leader;
or a directly elected mayor with a council manager. But there
is only so much room for new political organisations, and directly
elected mayors would surely be rivals for the political 'space'
that could be occupied by elected regional government. Moreover,
would it be feasible to introduce regional government and retain
the county councils alongside the district councils, in effect
creating a three-tier system of sub-central government? Would
not the creation of unitary authorities and the effective abolition
of the county and district councils, promised in Labour's 1997
election manifesto, be a necessary step along the road to regional
government?
The future
Last year, the Labour Party conference agreed 'as soon as
practicable, to move to directly elected regional government where
and when there is a clear demand for it'. The Constitution Unit
at University College London has argued that from being on the
political sidelines, the English Question and regional government
has moved 'towards the top of the government's second-term agenda.'
In March of this year, in a speech to business leaders in Cardiff,
Tony Blair announced that he was prepared to hand more power to
the English regions and 'where people vote for it, to move to
directly elected regional assemblies.' With strong commitment,
a freshly elected New Labour government could establish regional
assemblies by 2004. That said, it might well choose to move more
gradually, confining itself to giving statutory powers to the
existing indirectly elected Regional Chambers, and it does have
to confront the tricky issue of the relationship between regional
and local government.
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GENERAL
Impact on Westminster & Whitehall
Devolution has obviously had an impact in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland but no should ignore its impact on the very
centre of British politics. New machinery has been developed for
intergovernmental relations, mainly in Whitehall but also in Westminster,
and a new House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution
will play a vital role in scrutinizing relations between Westminster
and the devolved Parliament and Assemblies.
Coalition government
In Westminster, one-party majority government is the order of
the day but, thanks to the proportional voting systems, no single
party has a majority in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. Two-party
coalition government is the reality in Scotland, and now Wales,
whilst Northern Ireland struggles on with an 'involuntary coalition'
of four feuding parties. There are tensions inside the assemblies
and the executives between the coalition partners and 'conventions'
have yet to develop to ensure that a measure of ordered government
prevails over turbulence and double-dealing.
Policy benefits but who pays?
There are limits as to what devolved governments can do and Hazell
has argued that there are 'no significant policy differences'
and 'little to upset UK policy dominance'. This may be the BIG
picture but we have already shown that devolved governments have
come to do their own thing on a number of policy issues in ways
that actually cost public money, so who pays?
All three devolved governments are
funded on the basis of block grants from Westminster that are
uprated annually through the application of the population-based
'Barnett formula' that was introduced in 1978. These grants are
relatively generous. In Scotland, public expenditure per head
is 23% above the English average; in Wales it is 18% above; and
in Northern Ireland 39% above. All this thrusts the 'English Question'
to the fore, with northern regions feeling particularly disadvantaged
in relation to the more generous levels of spending just across
the border. Pressure is growing for a review of the Barnett formula
('it is not written in stone' said John Prescott in April this
year) but will New Labour in London rock the current funding boat
when those in the three nations have somewhere else to go politically?
The asymmetry of the devolution
settlement
It should be obvious from our discussion of devolution that there
is no common pattern. 'Each of the assemblies has a different
size and composition, a different system of government, and a
very different set of powers.' England, with 85% of the population,
is the gaping hole in the devolution settlement; there are those
who argue that Scotland is 'over-represented, under-taxed, and
excessively subsidised'; and across the nation, but especially
in Northern Ireland, we are dealing with a dynamic and unstable
process of change and not just a one-off and settled event.
Devolution has got off to a slow
and rather shaky start and although Westminster might be 'quietly
dominant' it is likely to be increasingly difficult for the centre
to control what happens as the devolved governments feel the need
to flex their muscles in response to their own electorates. So
far, there has been no break-up of Britain and no major rows between
Westminster and the devolved governments but little has been resolved
in Northern Ireland.
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CHECK OUT
Robert Hazell (ed) The State and
the Nations: The First Year of Devolution in the United Kingdom
(London, Imprint Academic 2000)
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/consitution-unit
J.Osmond and J Barry Jones (eds)
Inclusive Government and Party Management (Cardiff, Institute
of Welsh Affairs, 2001)
J.Curtice and L.Paterson (eds)
New Scotland, New Politics? (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University
Press, 2001).
http://www.guardian.co.uk/devolved
politics
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