

# Terror and Global Justice

The terror that the world faces cannot be understood in theological terms. That its perpetrators claim to represent Islam is neither here nor there. Proving a thousand times that Islam is not what they say it is will change nothing. Nor is it about the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, nor about Palestine, nor about poverty, nor about the clash of civilisations, nor about 'Arab humiliation' whatever that means. The only way to deal with such terror groups is to treat them as the criminals they are.

*Amir Taheri, The Times, 26 May 2003*

Globalisation is forging greater interdependence yet the world seems more fragmented, between rich and poor, between the powerful and the powerless, and between those who welcome the new global economy and those who demand a different course. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States cast new light on these divisions, returning strategic military alliances to the centre of national policy making and inspiring heated debates on the danger of compromising human rights for national security. For politics and political institutions to promote human development and safeguard the freedom and dignity of all people, democracy must widen and deepen.

*Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, Overview*

## Introduction

Many commentators now claim that the events and aftermath of 11 September 2001 have redefined the paradigm of global order and security. The consensus is that after the last epoch-marking event (the end of the Cold War) yet another profound historical shift has occurred. We do not yet know the full implications of what this shift will be, but we know at least, as Ken Booth and Tim Dunne have suggested, that when 'the victim of terror attacks of spectacular

horror happens to be the greatest power on earth, the agenda is set' (2002: ix).

The attacks of 11 September 2001 dramatically illustrated the rapid and deep changes in international relations brought about by globalization. As Part I of this book has shown, local conflicts are manifesting themselves globally and global conflicts locally, and the effects of conflicts can be felt far from their sites. As states and societies become more than ever open to events outside their borders, and images, belief systems, communications and ideas flow rapidly across societies divided by different ways of life and cultures, it is not surprising that conflicts of interest and perceived conflicts are experienced not only at the intrastate and interstate levels, but also globally. A hybrid mixture of local, regional and global conflicts has emerged, which we might call transnational conflict. Accompanying this change are uncertainties over how and where this form of conflict should be addressed. New doctrines of intervention and new understandings of 'peace and security' imply a redefinition of jurisdiction. If interests cut across states and communities, where does appropriate jurisdiction lie? How is democratic accountability to be effective in a world of interdependent decisions? How are conflicts to be resolved when they cross borders and levels of analysis? In this new 'neo-medieval' order, conflict resolution is challenged to redefine its scope and its praxis. We have used the term 'cosmopolitan conflict resolution' to indicate the need for an approach that is not situated within any particular state, society or established site of power, but rather one which promotes constructive means of handling conflict at local through to global levels in the interests of humanity.

The underlying argument in this chapter, which sets the framework for the second part of this book, is that addressing conflict formations both at the global and the local level is a necessary part of the response not only to new forms of global or mass casualty terrorism, but also to the threat of violence and frustrated needs in general. Terrorism, of course, is neither a legitimate nor a necessary outcome of these underlying conflicts. But tackling conflicts which create the conditions in which terrorism flourishes is necessary in its own right, and is also an integral part of the response.

Inevitably this agenda is related to wider debates about transitions in international order and the emergence of cosmopolitan democratic governance (Held, 1995; Shaw, 2000). David Held developed his analysis of democratic theory and cosmopolitan governance from foundations in the democratic peace ideals of Immanuel Kant. For Kant: 'The greatest evils which affect civilised nations are brought about by war, and not so much by actual wars in the past or the present, as by never ending and indeed continually increasing preparations for war'

(cited in Held, 1995: 226). Kant's remedy was his idea of an association of citizens who would form a moral community, a pacific federation in which war would be renounced as a means of politics. Similarly, cosmopolitan conflict resolution seeks to open new political spaces in which citizens from different parts of the world can tackle the transnational sources of violent conflict.

The idea of cosmopolitan conflict resolution rests on political, legal and moral foundations. Kant and his successors posited the possibility of a new level of political community, based on moral and political concerns beyond the borders of a particular state. The international law of human rights has given a legal basis for such concerns, setting out standards that states have committed themselves to uphold. Moral cosmopolitanism rests on the idea that the flourishing and well-being of human beings is a matter of concern to all. This applies to people equally, whoever they are, and it applies globally. In national politics it is a commonplace that the well-being of fellow citizens is a matter of common concern within a state, and that citizens of a state have rights and duties stemming from their citizenship. Cosmopolitanism widens these attributions to all human beings. It asserts that all have rights and needs that have to be protected, and duties to protect others. For example, cosmopolitanism implies that citizens have a responsibility for institutions which damage well-being elsewhere in the world, as Pogge (2002) argues in the case of world poverty. Similarly, there is a cosmopolitan responsibility for the lives and life-hopes of others being damaged through conflict. Cosmopolitan conflict resolution is justified, and should be held accountable, in terms of the contribution it makes to the long-term interests of the affected populations. Cosmopolitanism is therefore founded on ethical universalism, befitting the global age, as we argue in chapter 13, and on the view that the state-based international society of the late twentieth century has the potential to evolve into a world community, as we discuss in chapter 16. All of this is consonant with ideas about the evolution of a 'global civil society' as advocated by Mary Kaldor and others (Kaldor, 2003). In these respects, cosmopolitanism is a narrative that competes with terrorism and war, challenging particularist ethics and asserting the value and universal moral concern of each individual life.

## Conflict Resolution and Terrorism

In the conflict resolution field, the United Nations Development Programme approach to combating international terrorism cited at the beginning of this chapter would receive more support than that of Amir Taheri. This is not to underrate the importance of traditional

police responses to terrorism, nor to compromise moral clarity by condoning what are criminal acts – as universally agreed by the citizens of Madrid in March 2003, for example. But it is to insist that an effective response has to address the underlying sources of conflict as well as their symptoms.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and has been studied by writers on conflict resolution for many years – as indicated by the title of Burton's 1979 book *Deviance, Terrorism and War*. That is why, drawing on decades of analysis of the relationship between frustrated human needs and terrorism, Burton (2001) was one of the few who can be said to have predicted a dramatic increase in terrorism before the events of 9/11. We also applaud the refreshing frankness and courage of a theorist-practitioner like Lederach, who, within days of 9/11, offered his fellow Americans an imaginative conflict transformationist alternative at a time when calls for revenge were understandably loud (2001).

What follows should be seen to follow from the analysis of terrorism offered in chapter 3, where two conceptual clarifications are of particular relevance.

First, in chapter 3 we defined terrorism as a certain kind of political action, a means towards an end rather than an end in itself (see box 3.3). In most cases it is a strategy that is taken up and dropped by political groups according to how they assess the best way to gain their purposes in particular situations – as in the case of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, who pioneered the recent upsurge in suicide bombing campaigns, and have now, at any rate for the moment, abandoned them. Here is the clue for a conflict resolution response. The aim is not to eliminate terrorists, but terrorism. This neutralizes the familiar fact that in intense political conflict each side sees the other as the terrorists, and focuses instead on the core business of eliminating acts and tactics of terror no matter who is responsible for them. Does this mean being prepared to 'do deals with terrorists'? It means doing whatever is necessary within a wider strategy of the kind outlined below to persuade those who have adopted terrorist tactics no longer to do so. This is the way in which many, if not most, terrorist campaigns do in fact come to an end. There is no compromise in condemning terrorist acts. But political accommodation is made with legitimate political goals – although it is true that this will often involve difficult compromises in the area of amnesty and punishment, as discussed in chapter 10.

For example, in Northern Ireland terrorism has been the response of those who felt themselves oppressed, but not strong enough to meet their oppressor in battle. It is a characteristic tactic of the weaker side in what they perceive to be asymmetric conflicts. Characteristically, too, it is often undertaken by people who perceive themselves to be idealists righting previous wrongs. Yet in taking the struggle to the

stronger enemy, its practitioners abandon the traditional restraints on war and directly attack civilians. Despite robust efforts on the part of the British government, policing alone did not prevent the growth of terrorism in Northern Ireland. The introduction of the army followed by the internment of Republicans greatly intensified an already serious political conflict. Terrorism continued throughout the Troubles, both in Northern Ireland itself and on the British mainland. Only when the conflict resolution process was launched that eventually led to the Downing Street Declaration and the IRA and Loyalist ceasefires did terror attacks begin to dissipate (even then, the worst atrocity, the Omagh bombing, came after the Good Friday agreement). Getting the guns out of politics has been a slow, frustrating and incomplete process. But the curtailment of terrorism could never have been achieved by policing and military methods alone.

The second conceptual clarification to note from chapter 3 is the way in which typologies of terrorism relate closely to conflict typologies, confirming the idea that most forms of terrorism should be understood within the more general context of the forms of conflict of which they are part (see table 3.4). The exceptions were seen to be state terrorism and international terrorism, which did not coincide with usual conflict categories. We include them here because our definition of terrorism does not discriminate between those who practise it – and in the case of the former, both historically and quantitatively, it has been governments that have been responsible for most such atrocities. In view of this, it is important to differentiate appropriate responses accordingly.

*State terrorism*, whether the sponsoring of terrorist acts abroad (as formerly in Libya) or as domestic oppression (as in Zimbabwe or Sudan), requires coordinated action against the offending government and support for civilian victims. Similarly with the three main kinds of *insurgent terrorism*, whether ‘ideological’ (aimed at changing the nature of government), ‘national-separatist’ (aimed at changing the identity of the state) or ‘economic/factional’ (aiming to control some or all of the assets of the state). The first two are often amenable to a combination of firmness and incentives, albeit usually only after sustained attrition, since resort to terrorism tends to come once the underlying conflict has more widely reached the level of ingrained violence in any case. The third kind of insurgent terrorism is closest to Taheri’s description and is less open to political solutions. Finally, and now eclipsing all other forms, there is *international terrorism*, not in the sense in which most groups that practise terrorism have international links of supply and support, but in the sense that these are international networks that are not based in particular countries and whose primary political or ideological purposes are not confined to particular countries. Radical Islamist jihadis are now the most prominent examples, but earlier it

was Anarchist, Bolshevik and Maoist networks. Much of this is controversial, with some questioning the existence of Al-Qaida, while others suggest that it has some 18,000 operatives in sixty countries (IISS, 2004) (see box 11.1). The situation is complex and volatile as it is often difficult to distinguish actors and motives, and multiple agendas complicate the simplified typology offered here. Is international terrorism so different to other forms of terrorism that it requires an entirely different response? Although we do recognize differences, we do not think so. But, before moving on to outline a policy framework for overcoming terrorism that we believe is consonant with a conflict resolution approach, we will take a further step here.

### Box 11.1 Groups thought to have links with Al-Qaida

This list is impressionistic, since there may be few direct operational links in many cases. Al-Qaida acts as an ideological, logistical and financial hub – often through the offering of relatively small sums of money.

AFGHANISTAN Hizb-I-Islami	MOROCCO Jemaat al-Mustaqin (Salafist movement) Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM)
ALGERIA Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Salafist Group for the Call and Combat (GSPC)	PAKISTAN/KASHMIR Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JM) Lashkar-e-Yayyiba (LT) Al-Badhr Mujahedin Harakat ul-Jihad-Islami (HUJI)
CHECHNYA Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade Riyadus Silikhin Battalion of Chechen Martyrs Special Purpose Islamic Regiment	PHILIPPINES Abu Sayaff Group (ASG)
CHINA Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	SOMALIA Al-Ittihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI)
EGYPT Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (IG) Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)	SOUTH-EAST ASIA Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)
INDONESIA Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	TUNISIA Tunisian Combat Group (TCG)
LIBYA Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	UZBEKISTAN Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
LEBANON Asbat al-Ansar	YEMEN Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)

An appreciation of the political culture of the groups involved and of the conscious and sometimes unconscious motives of the individuals who participate in terrorism can begin to foster a more reflective understanding of the phenomenon. According to some accounts, Islamist politics stem from a profound sense of humiliation and subordination at the hands of the western colonial powers, combined with a rejection of secular western commercial culture, which is seen to threaten Islamic values. Halliday (2002) brilliantly dissects the general and particular causes of this crisis. The original aim of the Islamists was to create a society and a state based on Islamic principles. This drew them into resistance to the secular, modernizing trends in Islamic states as well as to the sources of those trends. The movement bound together political movements in disparate conflicts, from Palestine to Afghanistan to Kashmir and beyond. Combined with the crisis of the state in the region, this led to what Halliday calls a general 'west Asian crisis'. The Islamists' seizure of power in Afghanistan, helped by Pakistani intelligence, Saudi finance and US support for the *mujahadin*, created conditions for a new, militaristic and large-scale training ground for terrorism to be established.

It is also important to try to understand the mind-set of those who carry out attacks on ordinary citizens, however difficult this may seem. Here we run into difficulties highlighted in chapter 14, where competing belief systems (including those of third parties) generate conflicting explanations. The self-understanding of those responsible for terror is, insofar as it seeks to justify it, evidently at odds with those (including the authors of this book) who reject all acts of terror as ethically and legally unacceptable. At times it may seem simply crass, as when Basayev, asked why his group had massacred more than 300 children at Beslan in North Ossetia in September 2004, replied that Russians had killed more than 40,000 Chechen children over the past ten years (Gregory, 2004). Nevertheless, there are those like Rowan Williams, future Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, who was in New York on 11 September 2001, who are prepared to recognize in their own feelings of anger against those responsible a window of understanding into the hearts and minds of the perpetrators (Williams, 2002). From a psychoanalytic perspective, Britton (2002: 31) makes some suggestive observations on 'the suicidal act as a means of gaining approval and self-glorification'. The destructive drive, he suggests, is 'characteristic of a particular pathological organisation. . . . In this system death is believed to produce eternal union rather than loss, whereas continued life is felt to cause separation.' 'The fixation is to the infantile imago of an idealised parent who is more likely to be represented as God than as a human being.' Once again, we stress that all acts of terrorism are to be condemned as criminal, no matter how

great the provocation. But at the same time an adequate response needs to include some attempt to understand what drives those who are attracted to terrorism, and why Osama bin Laden 'is a source of inspiration to Moslem youth all over the world' (Covington et al., eds, 2002: 113).

### Conflict Resolution as a Response

It will now be evident why, from a cosmopolitan conflict resolution perspective, an adequate response to terrorism must do two things. It must operate where appropriate at all levels from the local to the global. And it must embed an intelligence/security-led *denial* response within a wider policy framework that also contains: a *prevention* strategy to address the breeding grounds for violent conflict and terrorism, a *persuasion* strategy to convince political groups and their constituencies that non-terror tactics are better and a *coordination* strategy to combine all these efforts under principles of contingency and complementarity (see box 11.2). It will also insist that this coordinated response must not in its execution itself contradict the anti-terrorism values in whose name the whole enterprise is undertaken.

A coordinated framework of this kind reflects the recommendations of the UN's Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism (UNPWG), set up by the UN Secretary-General to complement the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council (UNCTC) (established under Security Council Resolution 1373 in September 2001):

Terrorism is, and is intended to be, an assault on the principles of law, order, human rights and peaceful settlement of disputes on which the world body is founded. . . . So it is through a determined effort to bolster and reassert these guiding principles and purposes that the world body can best contribute to the struggle against terrorism. (A57/273 S/2002/875)

The UNPWG bases its recommendations on strategies of dissuasion, denial and the promotion of international cooperation.

### The First Dimension: Prevention – Reducing Proneness to Terrorism

This dimension of the strategy links with the aim of structural conflict prevention in general, in the conviction that development-led strategies 'can facilitate the creation of opportunities and the political, economic and social spaces within which indigenous actors can identify, develop and use the resources necessary to build a peaceful,

**Box 11.2 A policy framework for addressing terrorism**

<b>1 Prevention</b>	<p><b>Reducing proneness to terrorism</b>          Address perceived global inequalities and injustice          Address urban poverty among young men          Address lack of democratic opportunity (repressive states)          Address underlying conflicts – Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, etc.</p> <p><i>In general:</i> <i>Treat legitimate grievance with proper seriousness and respect</i></p>
<b>2 Persuasion</b>	<p><b>Reducing motivation and recruitment</b>          Uphold cosmopolitan values and human rights          Persuade insurgent groups and governments to choose political accommodation rather than violence and repression          Persuade domestic and diaspora support constituencies that non-terrorist options work best          Acknowledge and address feelings of hurt and motivations of supporters</p> <p><i>In general:</i> <i>Discredit terrorism/repression and alter calculations of its likely effectiveness among potential perpetrators and supporters</i></p>
<b>3 Denial</b>	<p><b>Reducing vulnerability and defeating hardliners</b>          Limit target vulnerability to terrorism          Cut off supply for acts of terror (finance, weaponry, WMD)          Strengthen international policing capabilities          Break up terrorist networks and arrest activists</p> <p><i>In general:</i> <i>Strike correct balance between effectiveness and upholding the values being defended</i></p>
<b>4 Coordination</b>	<p><b>Maximizing international efforts</b>          Apply principles of contingency and complementarity          Apply principle of comparative advantage          Respect the primacy of international law</p> <p><i>In general:</i> <i>Ensure that this is a genuinely international enterprise</i></p>

equitable and just society’ (UN Secretary-General’s 2001 *Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict*, Paragraph 29). This is seen to underpin the UNPWG approach:

If such efforts assist societies to resolve conflict peacefully within the rule of law, grievances that might have been expressed through terrorist acts are more likely to be addressed through political, legal and social means. (UNPWG, 2003)

In addition, ‘effective structural prevention measures would strengthen the capacities of States to avoid the type of protracted armed conflict that weakened Afghanistan and enabled the rise within its territory of transnational terrorist networks’.

Correcting undoubted gross global resource imbalances and discrepancies in the distribution of political power – often seen to fuel

frustration and historic resentments in the Islamic world – is too large an agenda to link specifically to the prevention of terrorism. But the resentments in the Muslim world against the colonial powers and the continuing elements of foreign political and economic domination are very real. The most powerful states, above all the USA, need at least to acknowledge the legitimacy of these grievances, be seen to be addressing them purposively, and to conduct themselves ‘with more humility and respect for the basic human aspirations of all people’ (Austin, 2004). Other suggested ‘breeding grounds’ for terrorism include ‘strong, authoritarian Arab and Muslim states’ where the failure of socialist and nationalist alternatives in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s left a vacuum filled by religious fundamentalism in the 1980s and 1990s. Western governments are seen as hypocritical because they ‘espouse democracy and human rights worldwide, yet support elitist and non-democratic governments in these states’ (Laqueur, 1999: 145; von Hippel, 2002: 36). Behind this lies the sense of alienation and lack of hope among young unemployed males in sprawling new conurbations (in 1975 one-third of the world’s population lived in cities; by 2025 it is likely to be two-thirds, while in many of the poorest countries more than half the population is under 16: even in oil-rich Saudi Arabia two-thirds are under 30, of whom a third are unemployed). And all of this is kept at fever pitch by unresolved conflicts, as in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya and Iraq, which fuel perceptions of injustice in radicalized Muslim opinion.

### **Democracy as an Antidote to Terrorism?**

One common prescription in all this has been the idea that the spread of democracy is the best long-term preventative antidote to terrorism. This is a common theme within the UN system, as seen in the UNDP extract at the head of this chapter. It has been built into the international response to the challenge of post-war reconstruction described in chapter 8. And it underpins the self-understanding of US policy-makers, where there is widespread cross-party agreement that the global extension of ‘wider liberty’ is the ultimate goal of US foreign policy (US National Security Strategy Report (NSSR), 20 September 2002).<sup>1</sup>

Can democracy fulfil these expectations? Does the ‘democratic peace’ extend from interstate relations, where it has been mainly discussed, to being the best domestic antidote to terror? We believe that it is as well at the outset to recognize that there are different understandings of democracy, which we cannot go into here, and that there are many difficulties to be resolved and overcome (see box 11.3). Developing a form of cosmopolitan democracy that offers a wider

### Box 11.3 Ten challenges to democratic peace posed by terrorism

- 1 How to find 'cosmopolitan democratic' resources to meet the challenges of international political protests, insofar as they are fuelled by legitimate concerns about global inequalities and injustice.
- 2 How to manage the challenge posed by state sponsors of terrorism and non-democratic authoritarian regimes that 'breed' terrorism, without inconsistency and 'double standards'.
- 3 How to build democratic peace in weak, usually poor, states where central government is discredited or non-existent, and where loyalties and authority structures lie rather in indigenous tribal and family units.
- 4 How to satisfy social-revolutionary challenges that deny the efficacy or even legitimacy of democracy in meeting the needs of the poor.
- 5 How to respond to radical religious challenges when democracy is seen as *parti pris* to secular interests, in the name of revealed truth.
- 6 How to accommodate nationalist-separatist challenges to the identity of the state in the absence of agreed independent democratic mechanisms to determine it.
- 7 How to combat, in ways compatible with democracy, the challenge from warlords, 'economic terrorists' and international criminals impervious to democratic principles, and from spoilers implacably opposed to democratic peace processes.
- 8 How to respond to critics who argue that liberal democracy is a western concept inappropriate in other cultures.
- 9 How to respond to critics who argue that western democracies are still in many ways undemocratic.
- 10 How to answer the question whether liberal democracy and market capitalism are interdependent, separable or contradictory. Perhaps future developments in China, India and Russia hold the key here.

sense of political inclusion is part of the challenge. What we argue here is that if political actions are conducted in the name of democracy, then certain clear implications logically follow. The best response from a conflict resolution perspective is to spell these out.

### The Second Dimension: Persuasion – Reducing Motivation and Support

This is the dimension of strategy that links the more general approach of prevention to the specifics of dealing with particular individuals, groups or governments that have either already taken up the terrorist option, or are contemplating it. There are three layers here: confronting ideologies of terror, persuading actual or potential terrorists to adopt non-terrorist options (and to persuade governments to act in ways that will maximize this), and reducing the appeal of terrorism within actual or potential support constituencies.

The confrontation with ideologies of terror is a large topic that can only be touched upon here. To understand the conflict means taking the relevant belief systems seriously (including those of past ideologues such as Maududi, Qutb and Khomeini in the case of Islamic groups influenced by them (Armstrong, 2001)), giving a hearing to

those culturally best placed to counter them (for example, moderate Muslim interpreters of jihad and the newer generation of Islamic scholars), and demonstrating the greater humanity and efficacy of non-terrorist alternatives. Of particular significance here is the recent spread of the Wahhabi-Salafi movement that originated in Saudi Arabia, especially in the form known as the Salafi-Takfiris.<sup>2</sup> This is seen by many traditionalists as an unwarranted assault on the entire Islamic corpus by those who wrongly claim to be returning to the original Quranic inspiration: 'Salafism is a recent innovation that is completely different in form, content and above all ethical behaviour than traditional orthodox Islam' (Olivetti, 2001: 75). In particular, Takfiri belief and practice is identified as 'the source of – and license for – indiscriminate terrorism and slaughter' with the aim of igniting a global conflict between Islam and the West, thereby gaining control of the former and recreating their version of early Islam (ibid.: 77). Needless to say, this is highly contentious. We are in the realm of the 'ambivalence of the sacred' (Appleby, 2000), where the so-called 'desecularization of the world' since the time of the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Berger, 1999) has placed a premium on recognizing the way in which all the great religions can be co-opted to serve violent ends, but also contain resources for the promotion of conflict resolution and peace (Gopin, 2000). Here we may note the salutary and refreshing correctives offered by analysts such as Shadid (2002) and Feldman (2003), who argue that the earlier 'adolescent' stage of Islamic militancy is now giving way to a more widespread and mature activism in which younger generations, losing none of their ideological ardour, are nonetheless learning that they can best pursue their goal of reform by renouncing violence, engaging in grassroots work in civil society and transforming their authoritarian societies by democratic means.

At the core of the strategy of persuasion is the aim of affecting the calculations of those who have the power to determine policy options within governments and insurgent groups. It means understanding what motivates different kinds of groups, such as the commander-cadre model and the networked groups model analysed by Stern (2003). This applies to all those who are politically biddable and for whom terrorist means are only one possible alternative among others. It also includes prevailing upon governments to offer appropriate inducements to encourage and strengthen the voice of the moderates. We are familiar with this in general terms from earlier chapters, only now it is applied specifically to the issue of terrorism. In other words, 'moderate' here does not mean politically moderate, but those who are prepared to use non-terrorist means. For example, Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo was politically intransigent (he insisted on full independence

for Kosovo), but he was moderate in the sense that he espoused non-violent methods. It is right not to negotiate with those using terror to hold us to ransom, but the door must be open to induce those who have used terrorist tactics to move towards political means. In innumerable postcolonial transitions, designated terrorists have transformed themselves into government officials, if not heads of state: Kenyatta in Kenya, Makarios in Cyprus, Begin in Israel or, more recently, Adams in Northern Ireland and Mandela in South Africa. Even UK premier Margaret Thatcher, whatever her public stance, was pragmatic enough to countenance covert exchanges of messages via third parties with Sinn Fein/IRA. Without such contacts there could have been no progress towards an eventual ceasefire. In Sri Lanka a cessation of LTTE (Tamil Tiger) terrorism has come about in part as a result of Tamil resistance to its counter-productive effects, and in part through externally mediated negotiations on the substance of the political conflict.

Finally comes the challenge of reducing the scope for recruitment and support from potentially sympathetic constituencies. These are always much larger than the core intransigent group, and defined by the general appeal of the political programme at issue. This is well understood by those who espouse terrorism and often aim to provoke repressive government response in order to activate this wider support. The same applies to the diaspora, which plays a key role in sustaining terrorist capabilities in many cases. Here another factor comes into play – how governments in the diaspora countries react. All of this requires careful, well-judged and sustained management – as recognized by the UNPWG through its Subgroup on Media and Communications and in particular its Department for Public Information (UNDPI). The UNDPPI was deputed to initiate a review of how the United Nations can reach local populations that support terrorist aims, using in-country teams as much as possible in order to determine the best means of conveying messages to target audiences. Among the UNPWG recommendations was that an international effort should be made ‘to mount a direct concerted international challenge drawing from the main cultural and religious traditions against all forms of religious extremism which encourages terrorism’ (this includes links with ‘the growing number of institutes and think-tanks in Arabic-speaking countries’). A coordinated worldwide education programme under the aegis of UNESCO should also be launched ‘to inculcate curricular reform which encourages the learning of tolerance and respect for human dignity while reducing mutual mistrust between communities, and to counter the efforts of some extremist groups who use education as a weapon of hatred and exclusion’.

### The Third Dimension: Denial – Reducing Vulnerability and Defeating Hardliners

We will deal briefly with this dimension of the anti-terrorist policy framework, not because it is not of central importance, but because there is less that conflict resolution can contribute when faced with those implacably set on murderous policies.

Under UNSCR 1373 (2001) the purpose of the UNCTC of the Security Council was to ‘improve the flow of information with and among international, regional and sub-regional organizations on counter-terrorism’ with a view to helping member states to coordinate their duty to deny financial support, suppress safe havens, and share information about ‘any groups practising or planning terrorist acts’. In monitoring implementation of UNSCR 1373, a good idea of the range of activity involved was offered in the February 2003 report where relevant bodies provided summaries of their ‘activities, experiences and plans, including best practices, codes or standards they have developed’ (S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2; 26/2/03). This covered legislation and implementation machinery including police and intelligence structures, customs, immigration and border controls, weapons access controls, cooperation and information exchange, judicial cooperation between states on extradition and early-warning, as well as links to other threats such as arms trafficking, drugs, organized crime, money laundering, and the illegal movement of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Relevant associated bodies included the International Atomic Energy Authority, the UN Global Programme on Money Laundering established in 1997, and the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, which launched a Global Programme Against Terrorism in October 2002, identifying countries needing assistance and coordinating the combating of transnational organized crime. The greatest single concern, dwarfing all the others, has been to prevent the nightmare scenario in which terrorist groups gain access to weapons of mass destruction.

But denial and suppression strategies need to be integrated with prevention and persuasion strategies. As an example of the former, we may note the failure to demobilize and integrate the Arab *ex-mujahideen* from the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, earlier armed by the CIA even though they were known to be practising terrorist tactics against Soviet forces and civilians (Austin, 2004: 2). This sabotaged the UN’s 1988 Geneva Accord and vastly increased the subsequent denial and suppression task when many of them refocused their efforts against the United States. As an example of the latter, we may point to the way denial cannot be separated from inducement in

persuading key suppliers to suspend their support for terrorism. In addition, we may once again note the recommendations of the UN Policy Working Group, namely that 'States should be encouraged to view the implementation of UNSCR 1373 as an instrument of democratic governance and statecraft' and that 'all counter-terrorism measures must be consonant with international human rights law'. One suggestion was for the UNDPI, with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to publish a digest of core jurisprudence of international and regional human rights bodies on the protection of human rights in the struggle against terrorism, and to convene a consultation with international, regional and sub-regional organizations and NGOs.

### **The Fourth Dimension: Coordination – Maximizing International Efforts**

We end by stressing that tackling the conflicts likely to fuel conflict must be a genuinely international enterprise. For the UN's Policy Working Group the key role for the United Nations in the development of preventative strategy and policy is to provide a framework for cooperation in which regional organizations would be encouraged to develop strategies appropriate to their own regions and which worked on the benefits of the comparative advantages each of them possesses. The UNPWG proposed that meetings between the Secretary-General and representatives of regional organizations should develop an international action plan in which the United Nations would cooperate with regional organizations in identifying best practice in the field of counter-terrorism and promote its adoption: 'The potential role of the United Nations in working with regional multilateral efforts fits within the Organization's roles of norm-setting, coordination, cooperation and capacity-building.' But counter-terrorism is only one part of an effective response; the other is to address long-standing injustices and unequal life-chances. These have long been central concerns for the UN system.

Seen in this way, the response to terrorism is one part of a response to a much larger set of global issues, which have to do not only with violence but also with human rights, opportunities for livelihood and free expression, and the life-chances of ordinary people. It is in attending to these sources of conflict, rather than launching military interventions, that preventive action is needed. An opportunity is available to be seized, since there is a genuine international consensus that terrorist methods are entirely abhorrent and unacceptable, but also that where associated political aspirations are legitimate they must be

seen to be addressed with the utmost seriousness. Global injustices and the failure of existing institutions to recognize and respect political aspirations need remedying for their own sake. But in the process, there is hope of addressing the sources of humiliation, rage and despair that are the fuel of terrorism. It faces many obstacles, but the cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach has a vital role to play.

**Recommended reading**

Booth and Dunne, eds (2002); Keeley 2003; Lacqueur (2003); Martin (2003: ch. 3); Stern (2003).