alan dowty  •  ISRAEL / PALESTINE

Welcome to Israel / Palestine online by Alan Dowty

In Alan Dowty’s fantastic introduction to the politics of Israel/Palestine he is able to demystify the conflict by putting it in broad historical perspective, identifying its roots, and tracing its evolution up to the current impasse. The situation in the area is constantly changing and so to keep readers of his book completely up-to-date, he will be adding updates to the news section of the website. Here is his first installment, in which he discusses events in the region between June 2007 and January 2008.

This material has been specially produced for the Israel/Palestine website, and is only available online:

Latest news - April 2009

When Israel/Palestine went to press in June, 2007, the Hamas movement had just seized control of the Gaza strip in a quick coup that dislodged the Palestinian Authority (PA) from any effective control over that area (p.185). In response, PA President Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the unity government in which Hamas, as the majority party in the Palestine National Council, had held the key posts, and effectively re-established his own movement, Fatah, as the dominant force on the West Bank. This de facto partition of Palestine -- Hamas in Gaza, Fatah in the West Bank -- remains the central reality on the ground in the Israel/Palestine arena, and any initiatives to stabilize the conflict, let alone resolve underlying issues, have to contend with the fact that President Abbas cannot speak for or implement any agreement in the Gaza strip -- roughly one-third of his theoretical constituency. In fact, it is not clear that he could implement any agreement that Hamas opposes on the West Bank either.

The chronological account in Israel/Palestine ends with the observation that "the objective pressures and interests that narrowed the gap between the two sides, in the past, were still operative," but that before these forces reasserted themselves, "it was likely to be a rough ride" (p. 186). Almost two years later, this judgment is still valid.

Let us deal first with the "rough ride." The divided control of Palestinian territories makes any serious peace negotiation improbable if not impossible, and even blocks efforts to achieve some kind of short-term stability. Palestinians themselves overwhelmingly favor the restoration of a unity government including both Hamas and Fatah within the PA framework, and Arab states have worked to bring this about. Unity talks have taken place at various times since the break, and in early 2009 serious negotiations under Egyptian auspices and pressure were taking place in Cairo. But the two sides remained unreconciled: the Fatah-dominated PA in the West Bank demanded restoration of PA control of Gaza as a first step, while Hamas sought a bigger role in security institutions on the West Bank -- the issue that had triggered its total takeover in Gaza. Hamas also demanded that, as a condition for joining the PLO, it be granted power proportional to its electoral strength, creating the potential for Hamas domination of this key Palestinian organization.

In short, the two parties were engaged in a struggle for pre-eminence in the Palestinian arena, and all negotiations were measured against this reality. There were frequent armed clashes, with each side acting to detain or neutralize activists of the other side operating within territory that it controlled. The approach of scheduled legislative and presidential elections in January, 2010, gave a greater sense of urgency to unity efforts, but with no guarantee that these efforts would bear fruit or that the elections would take place as scheduled, in both territories, under free and fair conditions.

The Hamas takeover in Gaza also triggered regional and international efforts to squeeze the new regime there by economic pressure and sanctions. International aid donors, a key lifeline of support for the Gaza population, initiated a policy of withholding aid to Hamas-controlled institutions and trying to channel it through international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Though direct humanitarian assistance to Gaza residents did not decline as a result of the boycott of Hamas, the overall impact was still an overall deterioration in living conditions. This was in large measure because of a state of near-siege of Gaza instituted by Israel, which controlled all points of entry into the enclave apart from the Egyptian border. Israel's policy was to bring as much pressure as possible on Hamas by allowing only subsistence-level imports into Gaza.

While conditions in Gaza deteriorated, conditions on the West Bank -- where Israeli settlements and forces remained -- also remained untenable in the eyes of Palestinian residents. Free movement remained blocked by some 600 checkpoints, and construction of the barrier separating Israel from the West Bank continued, if at a slow pace, but imposing further severe restriction on movement in the Jerusalem area in particular. Existing Jewish settlements continued to expand, especially in the Jerusalem area and in areas that Israel expects to retain as part of a future land swap. Violence by settlers against Palestinians continued to be a major issue.

Primitive rocket attacks from Gaza on nearby Israeli cities and towns had been a factor since the second intifada began, and their frequency rose sharply after the 2007 take-over, as a form of pressure on Israel to relax its siege of the territory. This led in return to Israeli air strikes and incursions in order to suppress the rocket fire, and also to try to stem the widespread smuggling, of both weapons and consumer goods, that rapidly developed through tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border. After a year of this low-intensity warfare, Israel and Hamas in June 2008 both finally accepted an Egyptian-mediated cease-fire for a period of six months. The cease-fire called for an immediate end to rocket fire and weapons smuggling, and to all smuggling once borders were opened, which in turn depended on progress in negotiations over the release of an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, held since 2006 by Hamas. But negotiations over Shalit stalled, isolated rockets were still fired, and Israel's blockade continued with little change. Though the frequency of rockets dropped from about 30 each week to 2-3, the cease-fire remained shaky throughout the rest of the year, with each side blaming the other for not fulfilling its obligations.

When the cease-fire ended officially in December, therefore, the situation reverted to a test of arms. Hamas resumed heavy rocket fire on neighboring areas of Israel, reaching further this time with improved missiles, and Israel responded with Operation Cast Lead, an air and ground offensive lasting 22 days that inflicted widespread damage and over 1000 casualties in Gaza. At the end of this period both sides declared a cease-fire unilaterally, meaning that the issues of weapons smuggling into Gaza, the release of Shalit, and the Israeli blockade of Gaza remained unresolved. Indirect negotiations, once again through Egypt's perpetual mediation, were launched but brought no immediate results.

The Gaza War of December 2008-January 2009 illustrated again the features of the new warfare of the fourth stage: no clear battlefield, elusive targets on the insurgent side (resulting in high civilian casualties), and fuzzy outcomes. Again the very definition of victory or defeat is disputed. Hamas, simply by surviving the war, could and did claim to be the winner. Israel, for its part, did reduce the hail of rockets on its bordering areas to sporadic attacks. But it was doubtful that the border with Egypt would be sealed to illicit traffic in arms. And while Hamas was weakened militarily in Gaza, at least for now, according to a recent poll its political support in Gaza increased from 23 to 28 percent, and its support on the West Bank grew from 18 to 29 percent.¹

Critics on the Israeli right claim that Israel again failed to complete the job by totally defeating Hamas or by ejecting it from power. But total defeat of a movement that defines simple survival as a victory was not in the cards. It could be achieved only by total Israeli reoccupation of Gaza, which few advocated, even among the most pedigreed hawks. In any event, 47 percent of all Palestinians believed that Hamas had won the war, against only 10 percent who believed Israel had won (and 37 percent who said neither).²

So the "rough ride" continues. What, then, are the moderating pressures that continue to operate? One, noted in the text, was the growing concern of Arab regimes over the rising threat of radical Islamist states and non-state movements, and consequent readiness of these regimes to cooperate with Western powers in efforts to defuse the region's troublespots such as Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. The increased visibility of Iran under its provocative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, fed by controversy over a possible Iranian nuclear weapons program, tied in with concerns about Hizballah (a Shi'a organization directly tied to Iran) and Hamas, also thought to receive support from Iran. Support and pressure from Arab states contributed directly to a new U.S. initiative, in late 2007, to revive peace negotiations on basic ("final status") issues separating Israel and the Palestinians.

The decision to convene a conference to revive negotiations -- essentially dormant since the Camp David and Taba talks in 2000-2001 -- was in some degree a reflection of the degree to which all the major parties felt under great pressure and in need of a dramatic move. The United States, beleaguered in Iraq, needed success elsewhere in the Middle East; the Israeli government, also in a very weak political position following discontent over the second Lebanese War, needed a policy that would pull together the Israeli center; the PA needed to establish that diplomacy, not Hamas rejectionism, was the road forward; and Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf states) sought to counter the momentum of Iran and its Islamist allies.

Consequently, the Middle East Peace Conference convened in Annapolis on November 27. Iran, Hamas, and Hizballah were not invited, but some fifty nations (including Syria, a key participant) did attend the formal opening sessions. The intention was to establish a framework for bilateral Israeli-Palestinian (and Israeli-Syrian) negotiations that would attempt to resolve all outstanding issues in the conflict by the end of 2008. There was general recognition that resolution of these issues -- the same ones that are reviewed in detail in Chapter 8 -- within this time frame, given the hurdles that remain, was a daunting if not foolhardy undertaking. Apart from the huge gaps that remained -- in particular, on borders and Israeli settlements, Jerusalem, and above all the Palestinian refugee issue -- loomed the central reality, as noted, that one of the two Palestinian territories remained under the control of a political movement that rejected not only the content of any future agreement but the act of an agreement itself. This was underlined by massive demonstrations in Gaza, organized by Hamas, denouncing the Annapolis conference in its entirety.

Thus prospects for a breakthrough on the diplomatic front, despite some auspicious circumstances, remained bleak at best. Few international diplomatic initiatives have been accompanied by as many predictions of failure, at the very moment of genesis, as was the Annapolis Conference. And the predictions proved to be well-founded. Though regular meetings between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and PA President Mahmud Abbas took place, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice made several visits to push the process, no breakthroughs were achieved. According to some reports, Olmert made an offer similar in many ways to the Israeli offer at Taba in 2001: the Palestinians would receive 93 percent of the West Bank (and 100 percent of Gaza), along with a territorial swap for the other 7 percent that would make it the equivalent of 100 percent. But with other gaps remaining on Jerusalem and the return of refugees, and with Abbas in too weak a position to implement an agreement over Hamas opposition, the offer was reportedly rejected. One idea floated during the year was to put any agreement reached "on the shelf," pending a time when it could be implemented, but this novel notion was not enough for Abbas to run high risks.

Political instability on the Israeli side also played a part in the demise of the Annapolis program. By midway in 2008, Olmert was facing no fewer than five ongoing investigations of alleged corruption, forcing him finally to call a new leadership election in Kadima on September 17. Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni emerged as the new Kadima leader, but was unable to reconstitute the existing government, forcing the calling of new general elections for February 10, 2009. With changes of administration pending both in Israel and in the United States, Middle East diplomacy in the latter half of the year was reduced to going through the motions.

The Israeli election of 2009 confirmed that a significant shift to the right, first seen in 2003, had taken place in reaction to events of the fourth stage. In essence, the 2009 election erased the impact of the 2006 election that followed Ariel Sharon's establishment of the new centrist party Kadima. If affirmed the result in 2003, when the second intifada produced the most hawkish Knesset ever. This turn to the right was set in motion by the second intifada, the rise of Hamas as the pivotal Palestinian player, the intrusion of Iran, and what was seen by many Israelis as the failure of unilateral disengagement in Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005.

Following the election, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu formed a government based on four right-wing or religious parties together with the Labor Party; Kadima moved into opposition. Though Netanyahu declared his support for peace negotiations with the Palestinians, his refusal to affirm support for a Palestinian state meant that there was no agreed framework for such negotiations. It was considered likely that the new Prime Minister, like his six predecessors (one of them Netanyahu himself), would try to move on the Syrian channel where the chances for a "land for peace" deal had always seemed more promising than the Palestinian channel.

There are also some other positive elements in the situation. First, Oslo is not totally dead. Clearly the Oslo process is moribund for now, and what remains of its vital organs are on critical life support. But it is premature to pronounce eulogies over its corpse. Oslo produced the first mutual recognition between established Israeli and Palestine leadership. Oslo introduced the first Palestinian self-governance on Palestinian soil. Oslo enabled the second peace treaty between Israel and an Arab neighbor, Jordan, stabilizing the longest international border in the conflict. Oslo led to Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, even if it did not completely stabilize that border. Oslo created ongoing Israel-Palestinian interaction on official and unofficial levels that has continued through all the ups and downs. Oslo shaped a majority on both sides for a two-state solution. And even in its ultimate failure, Oslo engendered the first serious direct negotiations over the basic issues of the conflict.

None of this has been reversed, nor is likely to be. Oslo deserves better than to be treated as the worst four-letter word in Middle East diplomacy.

Second, the common historical pattern is that ideological movements tend to lose their intensity over time. This has been the experience with both religious revivals and secular movements, including Palestinian national movements and, for that matter, Zionism. It seems especially true of movements that succeed in coming to power and then face the realities and pressures of actually governing. Ironically, the goal of non-state actors is precisely to become a state. So will the responsibility of governing serve to moderate Hamas over time? Like all such organizations, Hamas includes different factions and tendencies: insiders (those living in the West Bank and Gaza) vs. outsiders, political and military wings, pragmatists and ideologues. The decision to contest elections that were linked to the rejected Oslo framework was a pragmatic step, and the Hamas electoral platform called for "a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital" without repeating the prohibition of territorial compromise in the Hamas Charter. As with the PLO earlier, the "insiders" on the front line tend to be more pragmatic than the outsiders sitting safely at a distance. Perhaps, as with the PLO, power will shift over time from the outsiders to the insiders.

Subsequent Hamas emphasis on Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967 reminds us of the PLO strategy of "stages" enunciated in 1974, when that organization was midway in its evolution from total rejection to acceptance of a two-state solution. Khalid Mishal, considered a relative hard-liner, said recently that "there is an opportunity to achieve a Palestinian national consensus on a political program based on the 1967 borders . . . in which most Palestinian forces, including Hamas, accept a state." Will Hamas follow the path of other actors in the conflict and eventually seek a political, not a military, solution? It has not yet altered its Charter, or even debated doing so -- but who would have imagined in 1974 that the PLO would ever do so?

Third, despite all that has transpired in recent years, a majority of both Palestinians and Israelis continue to support negotiation and a two-state solution in principle. A poll of Israelis in August, 2008, showed 71 percent in support of a two-state solution, and when asked to choose between a one-state or a two-state solution, support for two states rose to 79 percent.³ In January of this year, following the war in Gaza, 55 percent of Palestinians favored a two-state solution (18 percent supported a binational state and only 12 percent called for a unitary Islamic or Palestinian state).⁴

But how can this be? We have just seen that Hamas won an election and that Israeli politics has moved to the right. Can people be both more hawkish and more dovish at the same time? The answer is yes. When there is a mutually painful stalemate, the two sides will look for a "way out," even while adopting more hawkish poses. In the Israeli case, greater support for rightist parties, on one level, is offset by the move of the entire political spectrum toward greater acceptance of political options that were anathema in an earlier period. There was a time when recognition of the PLO, or acceptance of a Palestinian state, were supported by a tiny minority of Israelis -- just as there was a time when the PLO rejected the idea of a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian state.

Israel's turn to the right does not mean the end of the two-state solution as the dominant model for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Likud's platform neither endorses nor rules out a two-state solution, but simply condemns any further unilateral withdrawals on the model of Lebanon in 2000 or Gaza in 2005. Yisrael Beitenu, the other major right-wing party, actually does not oppose establishment of a Palestinian state, and is ready not only to surrender Arab population centers on the West Bank and Gaza, but even to cede Arab-inhabited areas of Israel itself. In fact, in the recent election only two small parties, with seven seats between them, presented platforms of uncompromising opposition to any Palestinian state.

But it is also possible that once again quiet diplomacy may be overshadowed by dramatic developments on the ground. In this case, the continuing struggle over Iran's development of nuclear technology could easily take center stage. While the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Iran stopped its actual weapons program in 2003, the Israeli government believes that this program has resumed since then and remains a major threat. In any event, the continued development of Iran's capability to enrich uranium constitutes the infrastructure for a weapons program, which could be resumed when the enriched uranium becomes available. There is still strong support in Israel for action to prevent this taking place.

¹ Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, Public Opinion Poll No. 66, November 2008, and Public Opinion Poll No. 67, January 2009, http://www.jmcc.org/polls.

² Ibid., Public Opinion Poll No. 67.

³ Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research, Joint Israeli-Palestinian Poll, August 25-September 1 2008, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_
&_Culture/ispopal_2008.html .

⁴ Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, Public Opinion Poll No. 67.