

## CHAPTER ONE

# Peace Operations in Global Politics

The fullest perspective on peacekeeping... is one which places it firmly in the context of international politics.

James (1990: 13–14)

This chapter investigates different ways of understanding peace operations and their relationship to broader processes and trends within global politics. As the number and range of peace operations has grown, so too has the number of theories and concepts used to understand them. Meanwhile, processes of globalization are transforming global politics from an activity primarily involving states to one characterized by transnational relations between different types of politically significant actors which are connected by potentially global communications. Both the theory and practice of peace operations have been indelibly shaped by this changing global context. Initially, peacekeeping was concerned chiefly with creating the conditions for the peaceful settlement of disputes *between* states. This approach to peacekeeping is most closely associated with a Westphalian approach and ‘traditional peacekeeping’ (see chapter 7). On the other hand, new post-Westphalian conceptions of liberal peace insist that, because liberal democratic states are peaceful in their relations with one another, peace operations need to be in the business of fostering and maintaining a world order based on liberal democracy. Buttressing these claims are shifting conceptions of sovereignty. Whereas the Westphalian order rested on a notion of sovereignty that granted states protection from interference by outsiders, the post-Westphalian account is based on the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ – the idea that sovereigns enjoy the right to non-interference only insofar as they protect the fundamental rights of their citizens. Today, this post-Westphalian account is in the ascendancy but continues to be resisted by those who believe that it risks undermining sovereignty and, in turn, international peace and security itself. Many of today’s debates about the nature and direction of peace operations can be traced back to these two very different conceptions of world order and the different roles afforded to peace operations by each of them.

In order to analyse the roles peace operations play in global politics, this chapter proceeds in three parts. The first considers different ways of defining peace operations. The second explores different theories of peace operations,

showing how theory shapes the questions we ask, the way we approach peace operations and, ultimately, the answers we get. The final section sets out some of the basic principles of the Westphalian conception of international society and the role of peace operations within it before evaluating how globalization, 'new wars' and ideas about 'sovereignty as responsibility' have introduced a post-Westphalian challenge.

### 1.1 Defining peace operations

We need to begin by defining what we mean by peace operations. Definitions are important because without them we cannot narrow down a field of study or argue meaningfully about it. Definitions are also important because they all have consequences that lead the analyst in some direction while closing down others. Ultimately, however, definitions are just tools that are useful only insofar as they help us to understand better the issue in question.

On the face of it, there is little agreement between analysts, governments and international organizations about what peace operations are and the differences between terms such as 'peacekeeping', 'peacemaking' and 'peacebuilding'. Indeed, governments and international organizations have been prone to label many different kinds of military activity as 'peacekeeping', sometimes in an attempt to legitimize their activities (see James 1969: 9; Finnemore 2003). For example, when US forces invaded Grenada in 1983 to overthrow a communist-leaning military junta, US President Ronald Reagan labelled his forces the 'Caribbean Peace Keeping Force' (Diehl 1994: 4). In a similar vein, the Russian government described its counter-insurgency wars in Chechnya as peacekeeping and, more recently, US coalition forces in Iraq have on occasion been labelled peacekeepers (MacQueen 2006: 1).

The situation is not helped by the fact that the terms 'peacekeeping' and 'peace operation' are not found in the UN Charter. Of course, most definitions are not as obviously self-serving as Ronald Reagan's, but all of them are informed by their author's interests, experiences and values. We also need to bear in mind that, when we are dealing with a political activity such as peacekeeping, two actors looking at the same phenomenon might genuinely come up with two quite different ways of defining and conceptualizing their experience (Williams 2010). So politically charged is the question of defining peace operations that the UN has still not clearly stipulated what it means by the term. Member states remain divided as to the proper scope of UN interventionism and the relative merits of concepts such as neutrality, impartiality and the use of minimum force. As such, rather than define 'peace operations', the UN's *Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* simply lists the military and civilian tasks that peacekeepers are commonly required to fulfil (see table 1.1).

The UN repeated this approach in 2007 when it came to developing what was initially referred to as 'capstone doctrine' to guide the conduct of its peace operations. Rather than specify precisely what peace operations were,

**TABLE 1.1** The peacekeepers' tasks

Military	Civilian
Assist in implementing peace agreement	Help former belligerents implement complex peace agreements
Monitor a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities	Support delivery of humanitarian assistance
Provide a secure environment	Assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants
Prevent the outbreak or spillover of conflict	Supervise elections
Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government based on democratic principles	Build rule of law capacity
Administer a territory for a transitional period	Promote respect for human rights
	Assist economic recovery
	Set up transitional administration as a territory moves to independence

Source: (DPKO 2003: 2–3).

the DPKO simply identified 'peacekeeping' as one of five 'peace and security activities':

- *Conflict prevention* including structural and diplomatic measures to prevent disputes from developing into violent conflict;
- *Peacemaking* the use of diplomatic measures to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement;
- *Peacekeeping* the use of military, police and civilian personnel to lay the foundations of sustainable peace;
- *Peace enforcement* the use of military and other measures to enforce the will of the UN Security Council;
- *Peacebuilding* 'a range of measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict' (DPKO 2007: 10–11)

Although the categorization of tasks and situating of peace operations in a broader spectrum of measures designed to prevent and limit the incidence and lethality of armed conflict is useful in itself, it does not get us very close to a definition. For instance, we might ask which of these tasks are *necessary* for a mission to be considered a peace operation. This same problem arises in relation to various academic definitions of peace operations which focus on their functions (see James 1990: 1–8; Durch 1996a: 8). Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998: 38–40), for instance, put forward twelve different types of peacekeeping operations ranging from 'traditional peacekeeping'

to ‘sanctions enforcement’, while Demurenko and Nikitin (1997) identify seven types. Such taxonomies tend to be quite self-referential. Although they shed light on how missions are put together and tasked, they tell us little about the changing role of peace operations or the underlying rationale of the activities described. Moreover, they tend to be quite inflexible. For example, Paul Diehl and his collaborators have pointed out that other typologies forget that operations might involve the performance of multiple tasks simultaneously or alternate between different types (Diehl et al. 1998: 38).

In the absence of a UN definition, many people look to the earliest proponents of peace operations or the earliest historical examples for a guide to defining peacekeeping. Three such definitions are set out in box 1.1. The first two definitions are too narrow. Goulding’s definition would exclude peace operations by non-UN actors such as regional organizations (see chapters 2 and 13), while Diehl’s would exclude all those international missions not composed of lightly armed troops. Among these would be at least one of the UN’s earliest peace operations, ONUC in the Congo (1960–4; see chapter 3). By contrast, the third definition – proposed in an International Peace Academy (now Institute) handbook for peacekeepers – is in one way too broad in that it captures almost any attempt at third-party mediation and in another way too narrow by insisting upon the deployment of *multinational* troops, police and civilians, thus ruling out missions conducted by a single state. What is more, all three definitions assume that peacekeeping is defined by the performance of particular tasks. The tasks they identify were indeed performed in many of the earliest UN missions, but some early missions went well beyond them. The aforementioned mission to Congo (ONUC) was engaged in state-building,

### Box 1.1 Definitions of peacekeeping

Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (Goulding 1993: 455)

Peacekeeping is...the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory those forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved. (Diehl 1994: 13)

The prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace. (International Peace Academy 1984)

peace enforcement and human rights promotion, and the UN mission to Cyprus (UNFICYP) also had a human rights component (Månsson 2005).

This is also why it makes little sense to categorize peace operations chronologically. It is common, for instance, to distinguish two or three ‘generations’ of peacekeeping or peacemaking (Goulding 1993; Mackinlay and Chopra 1992). But defining peace operations this way obscures more than it illuminates, because there have always been different types of peace operation and their development cannot be easily broken down into chronological eras (see parts II and III).

Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) marked something of a watershed for the way peacekeeping was defined and conceptualized. The Secretary-General argued that peacekeeping was one of four tools that the UN could use to prevent and resolve conflict around the world, the other three being ‘preventive diplomacy’ (diplomatic action to prevent conflicts becoming violent), ‘peacemaking’ (activities designed to bring hostile parties together by peaceful means) and ‘peacebuilding’ (activities to build peace after a conflict in order to avoid its recurrence). Within this schema, Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping as:

the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is an activity that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. (1992: § 20)

The significance of Boutros-Ghali’s definition lay not in its wording – like those considered earlier, it assumed that peacekeeping necessarily involved the UN – but in its broader conceptualization, namely the idea that peacekeeping was one of several ways in which third parties might contribute to preventing, resolving or managing violent conflict and the rebuilding of communities thereafter.

Most subsequent definitions of peace operations have tended to put forth a broad general definition of a class of activity (labelled either peacekeeping or peace operations) with several distinct subsets, leaving out the actual composition (heavily armed, lightly armed, etc.) of the force. This is important because a mission’s composition does not determine its nature. A lightly armed mission to impose the UN’s will on recalcitrant belligerents is still an enforcement operation – albeit a chronically weak one. Likewise, a ceasefire monitoring mission equipped with tanks and fighter jets is still a ceasefire monitoring mission. Given the increasing prevalence of peace operations conducted by non-UN organizations (a far from novel endeavour), most contemporary definitions also reject the idea that only the UN can conduct peace operations. Thus, William Durch (2006a: xvii) defined peace operations as ‘internationally authorized, multilateral, civil-military efforts to promote and protect...transitions from war to peace’. According to New York University’s Center on International Cooperation (CIC), military deployments by non-UN

actors can be considered peace operations if they are ‘conducted by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states with the stated intention to (a) serve as an instrument to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements already in place, (b) support a peace process, or (c) assist conflict prevention and/or peacebuilding efforts’ (CIC 2006: 152).

Our definition is similar in kind to these. For the purposes of this book: *peace operations involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military) with or without UN authorization, with a mandate or programme to:*

- (1) *assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process;*
- (2) *serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or*
- (3) *enforce ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace. (See Williams 2010)*

Peace operations are therefore one general type of activity that can be used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as rebuild in its aftermath. Other parts of the international toolkit include conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, which involve the use of civilian agencies and NGOs in the reconstruction of polities, economies and societies. While each of these terms is contested, we will refer to them in the same manner as the UN (as set out above). In part III of the book we discuss seven types of peace operations, differentiated by their primary purpose: preventive deployments, traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, assisting transitions, transitional administrations and peace support operations. The next section of this chapter turns to different ways of thinking theoretically about peace operations.

## 1.2 Theorizing peace operations

Until very recently, there were few self-conscious attempts to think theoretically about peace operations. One exception was Indarjit Rikhye, who argued that peacekeeping provided a mechanism for resolving international conflicts without superpower involvement and involved the mobilization of international society to create the necessary conditions (Rikhye 1984: 234; cf. Rikhye et al. 1974: 8–18). But this theory tells only part of the story about the role of peace operations in the Cold War – that related to ‘traditional peacekeeping’ (see chapter 7; James 1994a). Another exception was the various attempts to conceptualize and test peacekeeping as a form of third party-mediation. A. B. Fetherston (1995) argued that there was a gap between the practice of peacekeeping (which was primarily about mediation in her view) and its theory. She sought to fill that gap by proposing a theory of peacekeeping predicated on theories of conflict resolution. In a similar vein, William Zartman (1985) tested the effectiveness of different types of third-party intervention, finding that it was likely to be effective only when

the parties to the conflict had reached a 'mutually hurting stalemate', and Fen Osler Hampson (1996) found that one of the principal determinants of success was the level of commitment on the part of the third parties themselves (see Paris 2000: 29).

To be sure, plenty of work on peace operations has had theoretical content. Indeed, the majority of the literature involves detailed studies of individual operations, often organized around a common framework of analysis to facilitate comparison (e.g. Durch 1996b, 2006b; Berdal and Economides 2007). Others have used more or less theory to explain why certain countries have adopted particular policies towards peace operations and why those policies have changed over time (e.g. Briscoe 2004; Stamnes 2007). A final subset of theoretically engaged studies has focused on the lessons that ought to be learned from past peace operations in order to improve future chances of success (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Howard 2008; Fortna 2008b). These have even included the development of theoretical accounts of the *unintended* consequences of peace operations (Aoi, de Coning and Thakur 2007). These types of studies have helped shed light on the general causes of success for peace operations, the contextual factors that make success more likely and the relative effectiveness of regional organizations (Bellamy and Williams 2005b; Diehl and Cho 2006). Others have focused almost exclusively on the failure of peace operations, leading one to believe – wrongly, in our view (see the Introduction) – that the world would be a better place without them (e.g. Jett 1999; Fleitz 2002; Polman 2003).

Given that peace operations are such practical activities, students might ask why we need to think theoretically about them at all. Indeed, some analysts have made precisely this argument. Somewhat paradoxically, Ryan (2000: 43) noted a need to produce 'a stronger conceptual framework for peacekeeping' while cautioning against 'too much theorizing', and Bures (2007) argued that 'macrotheory' was likely to obscure as much as it illuminated. A more important point was made by Roland Paris (2000: 44) when he argued that the study of peace operations had suffered from a 'cult of policy relevance'. This created a situation where 'students of peace operations... neglected broader macrotheoretical questions about the nature and significance of these operations for our understanding of international politics. This omission has stunted the intellectual development of the field and isolated the study of peace operations from other branches of international relations.'

We should, therefore, ask what gets missed from the study of peace operations if we neglect theory. The short answer is an awful lot; from the gendered effects of some peacekeeping practices (Whitworth 2004) to the ideational foundations of peace operations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) and the wider regional consequences of international interventions (Pugh and Cooper 2004). All investigations of social phenomena are guided by some theory or other, whether we recognize it or not. Theories help us to make

sense of complex and seemingly random social interactions. They tell us what to look for, what types of actors are important, and what counts as valid or valuable knowledge about particular phenomena. Theories inform the methods we use and the causal connections we draw, our values and our politics (see Booth 2007: 182–208). It is precisely because theory, broadly understood, is so important in guiding the questions we ask and the answers we reach that the UN has been unable to define peace operations. The protagonists to that debate know only too well that the way we define things shapes the way we conceptualize them and, in turn, our interests and our behaviour. It is therefore dishonest to claim to be working without theory when one studies political phenomena, including peace operations, for we cannot know what those phenomena are without theories. Although there is no single theoretical or methodological framework that can pose or answer the myriad questions associated with peace operations (see Druckman and Stern 1999), it is incumbent on analysts to be self-consciously theoretical and ask basic questions about what we are looking at and why, and what is excluded when we look at something in a particular way.

In this regard, it is a welcome development that the early twenty-first century has seen a steady growth in theorizing about peace operations. This has provided a range of answers to questions about what we should study and how we should study it. In the remainder of this section we will briefly evaluate several different ways of addressing these questions, first by considering the different levels and units of analysis we can employ in studying peace operations and then by assessing some of the most important newly emerging theories.

The question of what to study depends on *ontology*. Put simply, ontology refers to theoretical assumptions about the structures, actors and causal relations that constitute reality (Booth 2007: 184). In relation to peace operations, this raises questions about who the primary actors are, whose perspectives should be taken into account, and how we understand the relationship between social structures such as capitalism or ‘world culture’ and human behaviour. Two of the most pressing dilemmas of ontology relate to units of analysis and levels of analysis: the former relates to the type of actor whose behaviour we want to explain (individuals, ethnic groups, insurgencies, states, international organizations, etc.) and the latter to the level at which we want to study that unit (international society, regions, individual governments, particular government departments, etc.) (see Wight 2006: 102–8). Taking a lead from Kenneth Waltz, the pioneer of neorealist theory in International Relations, most analysts tend to separate units and levels of analysis into three: the international system, the state and the individual (Waltz 1959). In relation to peace operations, however, studies sometimes tacitly adopt a different approach, following the military’s distinction between three levels of war: *strategic* (the policy-making/strategic level), *operational* (the direction of the mission) and *tactical* (the direction of individual mission components on

the ground). As noted earlier, most studies of peace operations are conducted at the 'state' or the operational level, yet barely any acknowledge that they are operating at only one of several potential levels of analysis. Consequently, they overlook considerations such as the global forces that influence the direction and impact of an operation and – at the other end of the spectrum – the perceptions of marginalized individuals and groups within the theatre of operations itself. A first step, therefore, is to recognize that peace operations can – and should – be studied from a multiplicity of levels. The problem is that the three levels identified by neorealists and military thinkers are not enough. Instead, we suggest that peace operations can be studied from *at least five different levels* (see figure 1.1).

Both the general phenomenon of peace operations and individual missions can be studied at each of these five levels, and a comprehensive theory of peace operations would need to account for each (and other potential levels) as well as the relationships between them. It should instantly be clear that by opening peace operations up to ontological scrutiny we have immediately widened the range of analysis beyond the operational level. This helps to highlight the types of things that are missed when we focus on only one level and suggests the need for new theories and methods to assist us in understanding peace operations at the other levels.




Figure 1.1 *Levels and units of analysis*

*Macro- or structural-level* theories of the sort envisioned by Roland Paris try to explain the deep structural factors that shape the way peace operations are understood and practised. These include factors such as 'global culture', the world economy and the forces of patriarchy that produce gender discrimination (see below).

*Global-level* theories are interested in decision-making in global organizations such as the UN. These focus on the role played by legitimacy, norms and power politics in shaping political decisions or the way in which organizations develop their own 'pathologies' that influence the way they see the world, interact with others and behave.

*Regional-level* analysis can help explain how states in given regions reach shared understandings about the role of peace operations which may be different from those of other regions. They have also helped identify how patterns of conflict can spread across borders and how a peace operation in one country might 'displace' conflict into neighbouring states. Pugh and Cooper (2004), for example, show how the traditional focus on single missions obscures the way in which conflicts – and therefore missions – are inter-linked, a point demonstrated by a regional perspective on three recent West African conflicts (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire).

As we noted earlier, studies of peacekeeping have typically operated at the *national* level by focusing on either individual missions or the policies of individual countries. Such studies have become increasingly sophisticated in recent years. Often, country- or mission-level studies are comparative in nature, with studies organized around a common framework of analysis to permit cross-comparison (e.g. Durch 1993b, 1996b, 2006b). Others, such as Katharina Coleman (2007), use constructivist theories from International Relations to shed light on particular aspects of peace operations through comparative analysis. Coleman does this to understand better why states prefer to conduct peace operations under the auspices of regional organizations, finding that peacekeepers are concerned about the legitimacy of their operations and that legitimation can be acquired by working through regional organizations (also see chapter 2).

Given that peace operations aim to build sustainable peace in war-torn societies, it is surprising that until very recently the *local* level has been almost entirely excluded from the way they were assessed and understood. That this level is now included is owing in large part to the influence of feminism. Studies at this level have highlighted the ways in which masculinized and militarized peace operations have actually made some segments of the local population more insecure, through the commission of sexual exploitation and abuse (see chapter 16). What is more, anthropological studies have helped shed light on what local populations actually think about the presence of foreign peacekeepers (e.g. Pouligny 2006) – an astonishing earlier omission when one considers that positive perceptions are crucial if peace operations are to accomplish their goals. This approach has generated calls for local

actors to be better included in decision-making about the peace processes that will affect their lives in profound ways (Chopra and Hohe 2004a, 2004b). Another approach to understanding peace operations at the local level is to investigate the psychology of the peacekeepers themselves and uncover ‘the thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of individuals who attempted to establish peace’ in order to understand the factors that shape the effectiveness and well-being of individual peacekeepers (Britt and Adler 2003: 4).

No single level is necessarily better or more accurate than the others, and a comprehensive theory of peace operations would have to take account of each level and the relations between them. The important point to recognize is that, whether self-consciously or not, analysts *choose* the level and unit of analysis; they are neither natural nor predetermined. Neither do they stand in isolation from the other levels. In the chapters that follow, our analysis will draw insights and perspectives from each of the levels. Before that, however, we will briefly survey four of the main theories relevant to peace operations – liberal peace theory, global cultural theory, cosmopolitanism and critical theory – in order to shed light on the question of how we should study them.

#### *Liberal peace theory*

Without doubt this is the most influential theory in relation to peace operations. Indeed, in their attempt to construct zones of stable peace (Boulding 1978), both the theory and practice of peace operations are informed by an often unspoken commitment to the liberal peace (see Paris 1997, 2002, 2004). At the interstate level, liberal peace is based on the observation that democratic states do not wage war on other states they regard as being democratic. This is not to argue that democracies do not wage war at all or that they are less warlike in their relations with non-democracies; only that democracies tend not to fight each other. In addition, liberal democracies are said to be the least likely states to descend into civil war or anarchy.

Exponents of this theory generally present two reasons to explain why that might be. First, through their legislatures and judiciaries, democratic systems impose powerful institutional constraints on decision-makers, inhibiting their opportunities for waging war rashly (Owen 1994: 90). These inhibitions are further strengthened by the plethora of international institutions (such as the UN) to which liberal democratic states are tied. Democracy prevents civil war primarily because it guarantees basic human rights and offers non-violent avenues for the resolution of political disputes. The second explanation of liberal peace is normative and holds that democratic states do not fight each other because they recognize one another’s inherent legitimacy (*ibid.*) and have shared interests in the protection of international trade which are ill-served by war (Hegre 2000). Within states, the legitimacy associ-

ated with democracy makes it very difficult to mobilize arms against the prevailing order, reducing the likelihood of civil wars.

In arguing that peace operations are informed by liberal peace theory, we mean – by and large – that peace operations have tried to create stable peace by promoting and defending the principles that underpin liberal peace. This is most apparent in those peace operations that seek to build peace *within* states – which are increasingly becoming the norm (see section 1.3). These operations try to build stable peace by enabling the creation of democratic societies and liberal free market economies. They are often supported in this endeavour by Western NGOs (Richmond 2003: 1). There is also, however, a broad consensus that fostering liberal peace can contribute to reducing violent conflict *between* states. As box 1.2 shows, these beliefs are shared by powerful people and organizations, including two successive secretaries-general of the UN, the UNDP and a president of the United States. To be fair, there does indeed seem to be a link (though not a straightforward one; see Jarstad and Sisk 2008) between liberalism, democracy and peace, and, as we noted in the Introduction, the reduction in the frequency and lethality of war has gone hand in hand with both increased international activism and the spread of formal democracy.

### Box 1.2 Advocates of liberal peace

There is an obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities. (Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: 1992: § 59)

Democracies don't attack each other...ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. (US President Bill Clinton, in the 'State of the Union Address', New York Times, 26 January 1994)

Sound national and local legislatures and judiciaries are critical for creating and maintaining enabling environments for eradicating poverty. Legislatures mandate differing interests and debate and establish policies, laws and resources priorities that directly affect people-centred development. Electoral bodies and processes ensure independent and transparent elections for legislatures. Judiciaries uphold the rule of law, bringing security and predictability to social, political and economic relations. (UNDP policy document 1997: 14)

The right to choose how they are ruled, and who rules them, must be the birthright of all people, and its universal achievement must be a central objective of an Organization [the UN] devoted to the cause of larger freedom...The United Nations does more than any other single organization to promote and strengthen democratic institutions and practices around the world. (Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 2005a: §§ 148 and 151)

Although liberal peace is the dominant theory that underpins contemporary peace operations, its application remains controversial. China and many states in the global South, for example, argue that peace operations should be limited to assisting states and other actors to resolve their differences and should not be used to impose a particular ideology (Morphet 2000). From this perspective, stable peace can only be built on the maintenance of peace between states (Owen 2000), and this requires respect for the sanctity of national sovereignty (discussed in the following section). Because of these concerns, overt support from the UN for a broad liberal agenda in its peace operations has been limited to one of three situations. First, there are occasions when the parties to a conflict themselves invite the UN or other organizations to help install democratic government, as in the cases of Cambodia, Namibia and, more recently, Sierra Leone and Burundi. Second, the UN Security Council has sometimes defended democratically elected governments ousted by coups d'état (e.g. Haiti and Sierra Leone), though it has not done so consistently (e.g. Pakistan, Congo-Brazzaville and Mauritania). In the case of Haiti in the early 1990s, the Council resolved that the illegal removal of a democratically elected government constituted a threat to regional peace and security (Byers and Chesterman 2000: 287). In 1997 it likewise found that the overthrow of the elected government of Sierra Leone was a threat to peace, demanded that it be restored, and welcomed an ECOWAS intervention that did just that (Roth 1999: 405–6). Finally, the UN and other actors have sometimes attempted to create liberal peace in places where the state has failed to exert effective authority, such as Bosnia after 1995 and Kosovo and Timor-Leste after 1999 (see chapter 11).

There are other problems with the logic of liberal peace besides these political problems. Roland Paris (2004) found that the rapid democratization and marketization of post-war societies could have destabilizing effects and undermine the chances of long-term stable peace. Others deny liberal peace's basic empirical assumption by pointing to wars between or within democracies or arguing that the dataset remains too small to draw statistically relevant conclusions (e.g. Mearsheimer 1994). Echoing realist sentiments expressed by E. H. Carr ([1939] 1995) in the late 1930s, a third group of critics argue that the values underpinning liberal peace are not universal or causally connected to peace but reflect the ideological preferences of the world's most powerful actors (Barkawi and Laffey 1999).

### *Global culture and peace operations*

Drawing on world polity theory (see Finnemore 1996), Roland Paris (2003) argues that the international normative environment – a 'global culture' comprised of formal and informal social rules that guide international life – shapes the design of peace operations in fundamental ways (see box 1.3). Global culture helps determine the sorts of activities that are considered

**Box 1.3 The global cultural determinants of peace operations**

Peacekeeping agencies and their member states are predisposed to develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture, and they are disinclined to pursue strategies that deviate from these norms. In short, the design and conduct of peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interests of the key parties and the perceived lessons of previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global culture, which legitimize certain kinds of peacekeeping policies and delegitimize others. ... [G]lobal culture constrains ... peacekeeping by limiting the range of strategies that peacekeepers can realistically pursue. Peacekeeping agencies seem willing to rule out normatively unacceptable strategies a priori without even considering the potential effectiveness of these strategies as techniques for fostering peace, which is the stated goal of peacekeeping; and concerns about international propriety appear, at least on some occasions, to take precedence over considerations of operational effectiveness. (Paris 2003: 442–3 and 451)

appropriate for peace operations and rules out others, irrespective of whether or not they actually aid progression towards peace. Thus, despite its relatively good post-1945 track record, international trusteeship has been ‘disqualified’ as a policy tool because of its putatively neocolonial overtones. At the same time, the dominance of liberal peace theories – which hold that democratic states with market economies are less prone to conflict than those having other systems of governance – has pushed peace operations towards the early adoption of competitive elections and economic liberalization despite evidence of their destabilizing potential (see Paris 2004). From this perspective, the triumph of liberalism and its domination of global culture can tell us more about the shape of contemporary peace operations than lessons learned from past operations. To improve the effectiveness of peace operations we need first to understand the ideas that shape them.

*Cosmopolitanism*

An emerging cosmopolitan approach insists that the maintenance of truly stable international peace and security requires a particular way of understanding, organizing and conducting peace operations. Drawing from cosmopolitan political theory, cosmopolitan conceptions of global governance which emphasize inclusivity and accountability (e.g. Held 1995; Caney 2005) and principles of conflict resolution (Miall et al. 2005), Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham have called for the development of cosmopolitan peace operations (see also Curran and Woodhouse 2007). They argue that cosmopolitan peace operations should be conducted by a standing UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) comprising specially trained military and civilian personnel. UNEPS would be capable of protecting civilians from harm and implementing the full range of the UN’s human security agenda (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 2005: 153).

This is a contemporary variant of the proposal for a UN standing army that dates back to the organization's origins (see Roberts 2008). Between 1945 and 1948, there was a broad consensus that the UN should have its own army capable of deterring and reversing aggression. Provisions were made in the UN Charter for a Military Staff Committee to control and manage the army, and the US went so far as to assign military capabilities – including an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group and some 40,000 soldiers – to the endeavour (Lorenz 1999). The plan was scuppered by Soviet fears that a UN army would be an American stooge, but it has been resuscitated at various times through history (see chapter 6).

Some years before Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's proposal, Mary Kaldor called for peace operations to be redesigned as instruments of 'cosmopolitan law enforcement' (1999: 124–31; 2006). According to Kaldor, since 'the key to resolving new wars is the construction of legitimate political authority', the solution lay in the 'enforcement of cosmopolitan norms, i.e. enforcement of international humanitarian and human rights law' that would enable the protection of civilians and capture of war criminals (2006: x, 132). In her schema, cosmopolitan peace operations involve the creation of a new type of professional combining soldiering with policing skills. Such operations would recognize that it is unreasonable for peacekeepers to expect the unqualified consent of all belligerents – one of the basic tenets of traditional peacekeeping (see chapter 7) – and seek to secure the consent and support of the victims instead (ibid.: 135). This, Kaldor recognized, would require peace operations to use force against those that threatened civilians and would therefore involve risking the lives of peacekeepers. These ideas have been criticized for their simplistic portrayal of contemporary conflicts as involving only innocent civilians and their tormentors (Hirst 2001: 86), but some of Kaldor's proposals – such as the need for a new conception of impartiality and the centrality of civilian protection – correspond closely with some of the ideas set out by the UN's Brahimi Report in 2000 (see chapter 5). Moreover, cosmopolitan calls for a UNEPS-type entity has gained some support in recent years and was endorsed in principle by Sir Brian Urquhart and Satish Nambiar, two leading figures in UN peacekeeping (Johansen 2006). However, persuading governments of the merits of UNEPS remains an uphill battle.

### *Critical theory*

Drawing on the work of Robert Cox (1996), the social theorists of the Frankfurt School (especially Horkheimer 1972) and writers working under the label of critical security studies (e.g. Booth 2007; Wyn Jones 1999), several analysts have applied critical theory to the study of peace operations (see Bellamy and Williams 2005a). Critical theory starts from the presumption that theory is never politically neutral. Instead, it 'is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose. All theories have a perspective' (Cox 1981: 128). The *purpose* of critical

theory is human emancipation, understood as the freeing of people 'from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others' (Booth 2007: 112). As such, approaches to peace operations informed by critical theory typically examine two big and important questions:

- 1 What theories, values, ideologies, interests and identities shape the way we understand peace operations, and whose theories, values, ideologies, interests and identities are best served through the current practices of peace operations?
- 2 What theories and practices of peace operations are most likely to advance human emancipation and how might such advances be achieved?

In addressing the first question, some critical theorists have argued that peace operations maintain (and are informed by) a particular understanding of international peace and security that is ostensibly compatible with the capitalist global political economy (Pugh 2003: 40). Global capitalism creates peripheral regions of the global economy where the state and economic development collapse into anarchy and competition between warlords, who use violence to serve their economic interests. As new economic networks based on substate violence arise, so whole regions cease to be normal members of the Westphalian society of states (see below). Because its wealth depends on international trade, the global centre has an interest in preventing areas descending into the sort of anarchy that inhibits trade and the exploitation of raw materials. In most cases, the global centre is unwilling to sacrifice men and materiel to bring peace to peripheral regions of the world and uses a range of proxies instead – including the UN, regional organizations and humanitarian agencies – in order to maintain peace. Sometimes, however, the centre is prepared to act and despatches its own soldiers as peacekeepers. According to this theory, peace operations aim to establish and protect a neoliberal economic order (Pugh 2004: 41; Duffield 2001) or impose the 'normalcy' of democracy on chaotic parts of international society (Zanotti 2006). Similar perspectives are held by those who do not self-consciously identify with critical theory. For instance, Roland Paris (2002: 638; 2004) argued that post-Cold War peacebuilding missions try to 'transplant the values and institutions of the liberal democratic core into the affairs of peripheral host states'. Likewise, Christopher Clapham (1998) maintained that peacemaking has typically, and contentiously, focused on the creation of liberal constitutions.

In order to understand how peace operations might contribute to human emancipation, critical theorists seek to give voice to 'the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless' (Said 1994: 84). They share with feminists and anthropologists the view that it is important to seek out and illuminate the perspectives, concerns and experiences of those whose voices are often unheard – marginalized groups, ordinary citizens, women

and children. Turning our attention to these groups helps shed light both on the things that make people insecure (local violence, domestic violence, rape, poverty, inadequate healthcare, etc.) and on under-explored avenues for human emancipation. Such avenues might include understanding the coping strategies that victims and potential victims take to protect themselves, the local mobilization of women's groups to address chronic problems, and taking the opinions and contributions of marginalized groups – especially women – into account in the construction of peace processes and agreements (e.g. Stamnes 2004). Indeed, even the UN Security Council has begun to pay attention to this agenda, and in October 2000 passed Resolution 1325, recognizing the importance of female participation in all peace and security initiatives, requiring UN personnel to receive gender training, setting out the need to protect women and girls and their human rights during and after armed conflict, and calling for gender mainstreaming throughout the UN system (discussed further in chapter 16).

The four theoretical approaches discussed above provide different ways of understanding peace operations. They do not exhaust the potential options or cover every aspect of the five levels of analysis described earlier. Nor do they dictate what methods ought to be used. But they do remind us that our decisions about what to study and how to study it will profoundly affect both the results analysts come up with and the policy agendas that flow from them. It is important, therefore, to understand which theoretical tradition and which level or unit of analysis we adopt and reflect upon what is excluded by that choice. Exclusion is an inevitable consequence of studying a phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as peace operations, but it is important that we acknowledge what is missing from our own studies and value insights gathered from alternative perspectives and levels.

### 1.3 Peace operations and contemporary world politics

Having explored different ways of defining and theorizing peace operations, this final section outlines the changing nature of international order and the place of peace operations within it. Our basic claim here is that peace operations were initially conceived as a tool for maintaining order between states in an international society based on rules arising from state sovereignty, especially non-aggression and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. We label this context the 'Westphalian' society of states. Within this society, the principal role of peace operations was the facilitation of peaceful settlements *between* states. As globalization has gathered pace, so the relationships between states and societies have deepened, casting doubt on the political significance of state boundaries and giving rise to new ideas about sovereignty. According to these new ideas, states enjoy full sovereign rights only if they fulfil certain responsibilities towards their citizens, such

as protecting them from genocide and mass atrocities. Within this conception of international society, which we label 'post-Westphalian', the role of peace operations is to assist states in fulfilling these responsibilities and, where necessary, to assume those responsibilities when the host state proves itself unable or unwilling to do so. Although this conception has come into ascendancy and informs the majority of contemporary UN peace operations, it remains highly controversial. It is resisted by some states of the global South, who continue to defend the Westphalian order. In what remains of this chapter, we will unpack this story a little more. We first evaluate the Westphalian conception, then briefly look at globalization before focusing on the post-Westphalian conception.

### *The Westphalian order*

The Westphalian order takes its name from the Westphalian settlements concluded at the end of Europe's Thirty Years' War (1618–48), which took place between the 'Union' of Protestant German princes and free cities and the 'League' of their Catholic counterparts (Jackson 2000: 162–7). Politically, the treaties recognized the territorial sovereignty of the approximately 300 states and statelets within Europe. They also symbolized the sovereign state's success in prevailing over other forms of political organization (see Tilly 1992) and its acquisition of five key monopolies:

- 1 the right to monopolize control of the instruments of violence;
- 2 the sole right to collect taxes;
- 3 the prerogative of ordering the political allegiances of citizens and of enlisting their support in war;
- 4 the right to adjudicate in disputes between citizens;
- 5 the exclusive right of representation in international society. (Linklater 1998: 28)

The treaties also reaffirmed the Peace of Augsburg (1555) at which the principle of *cujus regio ejus religio* was formulated, whereby each ruler declared which brand of Christianity (Protestantism or Catholicism) would hold exclusive rights within their territories and other rulers agreed to respect the sovereign's right to determine his country's religion (Jackson 2000: 163).

The state's success in Europe brought with it the development of three fundamental norms (Jackson 2000: 166–7). The first norm held that the king was emperor in his own realm. Thus, sovereigns were not subject to any higher political authority. The second was that outsiders had no right to intervene in a foreign jurisdiction on the grounds of religion, and the third affirmed the European balance of power as a means of preventing one state from making a successful bid for hegemony that would, in effect, re-establish empire on the continent. According to Jackson (*ibid.*: 182), these three norms created an international order that permitted different cultures and nations

to live according to their own preferences while respecting the rights of others to do likewise and avoiding the danger of assimilation.

Although we use the label 'Westphalian' to describe this order, these norms evolved incrementally and took nearly three hundred years to develop fully. We should also not make the mistake of thinking that this system was anything like universal. Despite the ascendancy of sovereign states, most of Europe was actually governed by empire (Russian, Austrian and Ottoman) until 1918 and the norms of international society applied only to European – and a small handful of non-European – states. A quite different set of rules applied in the colonized world (see Keene 2002). Finally, the norms and practices that characterized European diplomacy in this Westphalian order were Christian and Latin (Stern 1999: 65–9). The defining characteristics of this expanded body of rules are summarized in box 1.4.

After the Second World War the Westphalian order expanded to cover the entire globe, as former colonies sought to take their place as sovereign states (see Bull and Watson 1984; Jackson 2001). Between 1947 and 1967, the society of states expanded from about fifty to over 160 (Jackson 2001: 46) and today numbers 192. In some places the transition to sovereign statehood was relatively peaceful, but in others – such as Indochina, Algeria and Congo – decolonization was a bloody, protracted and hard-fought affair. If a global Westphalian order was to survive, it was thought necessary to close some of the loopholes evident in its pre-1945 order. In particular, how could one protect a sovereign's right to rule if there was no barrier to strong states simply overpowering weak states to impose their will upon them? With decolonization and the expansion of the Westphalian order, therefore, came calls to protect the sanctity of state sovereignty through law.

#### **Box 1.4 The Westphalian conception of international law**

- 1 The world consists of, and is divided into, sovereign territorial states which recognize no superior authority.
- 2 The processes of law-making, the settlement of disputes, and law enforcement are largely in the hands of individual states.
- 3 International law is oriented to the establishment of minimal rules of coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships among states and people is an aim, but only to the extent that it allows state objectives to be met.
- 4 Responsibility for cross-border wrongful acts is a 'private matter' concerning only those affected.
- 5 All states are regarded as equal before the law: legal rules do not take account of asymmetries of power.
- 6 Differences among states are often settled by force; the principle of effective power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the resort to force; international legal standards afford minimal protection.
- 7 The minimization of impediments to state freedom is the 'collective priority'.

*Source:* Held et al. 1999: 37–8

These concerns were aired by a number of small states during the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945. Australia, Bolivia, Brazil and Norway all argued that it should proscribe the use of force completely and without legal loopholes (Chesterman 2001: 49). This, combined with a concern to prevent potential future Hitlers, produced Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibiting the use of force (see chapter 2). Latin American states also argued that the UN should contain rules protecting their sovereign right to determine their own form of government. Article 2(7) thus insisted that the new organization would not interfere in the domestic affairs of its members (see chapter 2). In the subsequent years, the message from the post-colonial world was loud and clear. In 1960, the UN General Assembly issued its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Adopted by a majority of eighty-nine votes to none, with nine abstentions, the declaration proclaimed that 'all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development' (in Shaw 2003: 227).

For the leaders of many post-colonial states, there was a direct relationship between a people's right freely to determine its political status and the non-interference rule. After all, they argued, there could be no right of national self-determination if powerful states felt entitled to interfere in the affairs of the weak. The General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations stated categorically that:

No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state, or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.

Many academics support this argument and maintain that, because national communities are so different, and because difference is a good worth preserving, international order can be achieved only by rigid adherence to Westphalian principles (Jackson 2000: 291; 2005: 73, 100). They argue that it is a short road from relaxing the Westphalian order's non-interference rule to re-legitimizing colonialism. International commitment to the Westphalian order remains widespread and steadfast. It is a position endorsed by a majority of states in the General Assembly, by many international lawyers and by some groups of politicians and activists in the West.

It was in the context of a pre-eminent Westphalian order that peace operations originated and developed (see part 2). Westphalian-style peace operations are concerned primarily with the peaceful resolution of disputes between states but might also assist states in the suppression of separatist movements or in the building of state capacity. Upholding and protecting Westphalian values, however, such operations acted only with the consent of the sovereign states involved and sought merely to create the conditions

necessary to facilitate the resolution of conflicts by state parties. But since the end of the Cold War the Westphalian order – and its attendant conception of peace operations – has come under challenge from processes of globalization and changing ideas about the meaning of sovereignty.

### *Contemporary globalization and 'new wars'*

It is often argued that recent transformations in peace operations are the result, by and large, of the end of the Cold War. Another important but often overlooked fact is the role of globalization in this transformation. Globalization can be understood as an uneven set of processes that affect all areas of human activity, not just the economy. Chief among the list of motors driving globalization are technological developments, especially in the field of communications, economic growth and integration, and the expansion of the Western influence. Much of the literature on globalization assumes that, as it accelerates and intensifies, so the 'limits to national politics' are increasingly exposed (Held et al. 1999: 1). Consequently, state power is often depicted as retreating in the face of globalization and the revival of non-state sources of power and authority (e.g. Ohmae 1995; Strange 1996). In practice, however, instead of becoming politically redundant, states exist in a mutually constitutive relationship with globalization (Clark 1997). States thus both constitute a principal driver of globalization and are being radically transformed by it. This is hardly surprising if we take seriously insights from historical sociology that states and transnational forces (such as capitalism and religion) have often interacted with each other in this way (Mann 1986, 1993; Tilly 1992). But globalization has not affected the world evenly. Whereas the policies of the most powerful states – especially the US and the G-8 and more recently the G-20 – have actively facilitated the acceleration of economic globalization, weaker states have generally been forced to react to processes initiated elsewhere. As a result, the nature and impact of globalization differs from region to region (Hay 2000). An instructive guide to globalization is provided by the five characteristics identified by Held et al. (1999: 8).

- 1 Globalization can best be understood as a process or set of processes rather than a singular condition.
- 2 The spatial reach and density of global and transnational interconnectedness have created complex webs and networks of relations between communities, states, international institutions, non-governmental organizations and transnational corporations which make up the global order.
- 3 Few areas of social life escape the reach of globalization.
- 4 By cutting across political frontiers globalization is associated with both the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of socio-economic and political space.

**Box 1.5 The actors in global politics**

- Nearly 200 governments, including 192 members of the United Nations
- 77,200 transnational companies, such as Shell, Barclays Bank, Vodafone, Microsoft, Coca-Cola and Ford (these parent companies have just over 773,000 foreign affiliates)
- 10,000 single-state NGOs, such as Freedom House (US) and Population Concern (UK), which engage in significant international activities
- 246 intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, NATO, the African Union, the European Union and the International Coffee Association
- 7,300 international NGOs, such as Amnesty International, the Baptist World Alliance and the International Red Cross, plus a similar number of less well-established international caucuses and networks of NGOs

Source: adapted and modified from Willetts 2008: 332.

- 5 Power relations are deeply inscribed in the very processes of globalization. In particular, globalization concerns the expanding scale of the networks through which power is organized and exercised.

The processes of contemporary globalization have clearly affected the way in which peace operations are conceptualized and conducted (see Jakobsen 2002), but the exact nature of those effects is contested. David Held et al. (1999: 1–2) have identified four key questions that lie at the root of the many controversies and debates about globalization: What is globalization and how should it be conceptualized?, Does contemporary globalization represent a novel condition?, Is globalization associated with the demise, the resurgence or the transformation of state power? and Does contemporary globalization impose new limits to politics? If so, how can globalization be ‘civilized’ and democratized? These questions have, in turn, stimulated five main sources of contention in the globalization debate: conceptualization, causation, periodization, the trajectories and the political impacts of globalization (ibid.: 10–14).

Although some analysts argue that globalization is a recent phenomenon, this is not a view we share. Instead, we understand globalization as being a set of processes with a long history, some of which pre-date modernity (see Barkawi 2006). It is for this reason that several analysts have attempted to periodize its development into historical phases in order to gain a more sophisticated appreciation of the novel features of globalization in the contemporary era.

A variety of analysts have suggested that, particularly since 1945, the processes of globalization have given rise to a distinctive form of armed conflict commonly labelled ‘new wars’ (see Kaldor 1999, 2006; Newman 2004; Münkler 2005). According to Mary Kaldor, in these ‘new wars’ the traditional

**Box 1.6 The main elements of the 'new wars' thesis**

- New wars are intrastate rather than interstate wars.
- New wars take place in the context of state failure and social transformation driven by globalization and liberal economic forces.
- In new wars, ethnic and religious differences are more important than political ideology.
- In new wars, civilian casualties and forced displacement are dramatically increasing. This is primarily because civilians are being deliberately targeted.
- In new wars, the breakdown of state authority blurs the distinction between public and private combatants.

Source: Newman 2004.

distinctions between war (violence between states or organized political groups for political reasons), organized crime (violence by private associations, usually for private gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence by states or private groups against individuals, mainly civilians) are blurred. 'New wars' are distinguished from old, interstate wars primarily by their distinct goals, methods and systems of finance, born out of the erosion of the relevant state's monopoly of legitimate organized violence. This led one analyst to describe them as 'state disintegrating' wars (Münkler 2005: 8; see also box 1.6).

The goals of combatants can be understood in the context of a struggle fought between cosmopolitan and exclusivist identities, the latter seeking to control a given population by ethnically cleansing all those of a different identity or who espouse a cosmopolitan political opinion. The 'new wars' are fought through a novel 'mode of warfare' that draws on both guerrilla techniques and counter-insurgency, though the main target for attack is usually the civilian population and not other militia groups or government forces. This mode of warfare is distinctive because decisive confrontations are typically avoided and territory is controlled through political manipulation and fear rather than winning 'hearts and minds'. 'New wars' are financed by a globalized war economy that is decentralized and increasingly transnational, and in which the fighting units are often self-funding through plunder and the black market (see also Keen 2001; Duffield 2001). This means that some people can benefit from continued warfare. As David Keen has observed, for some belligerents, 'Winning may not be desirable: the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes' (1998: 11–12). Finally, to make matters worse, 'new wars' often generate crises such as famine or occur alongside natural disasters, creating 'complex emergencies' (Keen 2008).

Understood in this manner, peacekeepers operating in such environments must try and address the challenges raised by their particular strain of identity politics, their mode of warfare, and their globalized systems of finance.

Kaldor argued that the resolution of ‘new wars’ requires ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’ wherein peacekeepers are mandated to enforce human rights law and reconstitute legitimate political communities (1999: 10–11). This goes well beyond the image of international assistance or peacekeeping envisaged by advocates of a Westphalian order and implies the emergence of a post-Westphalian conception of international order based on the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (see chapter 2).

### *The post-Westphalian approach*

Post-Westphalian conceptions of world order have been around for a long time but came to the fore after the end of the Cold War. Echoes of this approach can be heard in the Preamble of the UN Charter, which in many other ways is a document prescribing Westphalian rules for the world. In the Preamble, member states promised to ‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’ – an ambition that goes well beyond the maintenance of stable peace between states through rules of mutual coexistence. In the post-Cold War era, leading proponents of the post-Westphalian conception of world order included the former British prime minister Tony Blair and Francis Deng, the UN’s Special Representative on Internal Displacement and then Special Representative on the Prevention of Genocide. The key tenets of the Westphalian and post-Westphalian approaches are set out in table 1.2 below.

During NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo/Serbia, Blair travelled to the US to shore up American support for the war, and gave a now famous

**TABLE 1.2** Westphalian and post-Westphalian approaches

	Westphalian	Post-Westphalian
<b>Sovereign responsibility</b>	Limited to relations with other states	Relations with other states <i>and</i> for treatment of citizens
<b>Non-interference</b>	Absolute (more or less) right of sovereigns	Dependent on fulfilment of responsibilities to citizens
<b>Peace operations (inter-state)</b>	Most frequent. Consensual activity designed to facilitate peaceful settlement of disputes between states	Less frequent. Usually designed to facilitate peaceful settlement of disputes between states
<b>Peace operations (intra-state)</b>	Less frequent. Limited engagement to assist states deployed only at request of host state	Most frequent. Extensive engagement to facilitate or sometimes impose liberal democratic polities and economies
<b>Key advocates</b>	China, India, Cuba, NAM	Western Europe, UN Secretary-General

**Box 1.7 Tony Blair's 'doctrine of the international community'**

We live in a world where isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist. By necessity we have to co-operate with each other across nations. Many of our domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world... We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. We cannot refuse to participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political ideas in other countries if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure...

The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts. Non-interference has long been considered an important principle of international order. And it is not one we would want to jettison too readily... But the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. (Blair 1999)

speech in Chicago in which he set out a new, post-Westphalian, 'doctrine of the international community' (see box 1.7). He argued that sovereignty should be reconceptualized because globalization was changing the world in ways that made the traditional Westphalian approach anachronistic. According to Blair, global interconnectedness created a responsibility for international society to deal with egregious human suffering wherever it occurred because, as US President John F. Kennedy had argued in the 1960s, in an interdependent world, 'freedom is indivisible and when one man is enslaved who is free?'. Individual sovereigns were responsible to international society for the welfare of their own citizens because, in an era of globalization, domestic problems spread across borders causing international mayhem (Blair 1999).

The idea that sovereignty ought to entail certain responsibilities had been put forth a few years earlier by Francis Deng and his colleagues. Deng, a well-respected former Sudanese diplomat, was appointed Special Representative on Internally Displaced People (IDPs) by Boutros-Ghali in 1993. As wars became less a matter between states and more a struggle between competing state and non-state actors, so the proportion of civilians killed and displaced increased. When Deng was appointed, there were some 25 million IDPs globally (Weiss 2007: 90). If these civilians crossed an international border they would be entitled to claim refugee status, providing that their host was either a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or accepting the help of the UNHCR (see Davies 2007). As IDPs, however, they were afforded no special protection and remained vulnerable to the whims or failings of their home state. Deng recognized that this made them particularly vulnerable and noted that they suffered significantly higher mortality rates than the general population (2004: 18–20).

To argue his way around the use of sovereignty to deny international assistance for IDPs, Deng postulated an alternative, post-Westphalian, account.

Instead of being a barrier against international involvement, sovereignty was described as a state's responsibility to protect its neediest citizens. Where a state was unable to fulfil its responsibilities, it should invite and welcome international assistance to 'complement national efforts' (Deng 2004: 20). The best way for a vulnerable or failing state to protect its sovereignty, Deng argued, was by inviting international assistance. The corollary of sovereignty in this view, therefore, is accountability. The host state is made accountable to its citizens, and international society acquires a responsibility to assist that state or, in extreme cases, to act to fulfil its responsibilities to its citizens even without the state's consent. As Deng et al. (1996: 1) put it:

Sovereignty carries with it certain responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And they are accountable not only to their national constituencies but ultimately to the international community. In other words, by effectively discharging its responsibilities for good governance, a state can legitimately claim protection for its national sovereignty.

This post-Westphalian understanding of international society holds that states receive their sovereign rights only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens, chief among them the protection of civilians from arbitrary killing. This implies a very different role for peace operations to that envisaged by a Westphalian conception of international society. According to the post-Westphalian perspective, peace operations need to be in the business of protecting human rights where host states prove unwilling or unable to do so, and of helping to build states capable of fulfilling their responsibilities in the long term. It is not hard to see how this post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty is closely related to the liberal peace theory described earlier. If the aim of peace operations is to help build states and societies capable of fulfilling their responsibilities, and if we believe that liberal and democratic societies are most effective in this regard, then it stands to reason that peace operations need to be in the business of aiding the spread of liberal democracy. According to at least two analysts, building peace out of 'new wars' requires the transformation of governing systems along liberal lines by external interveners (Ottaway and Lacinia 2003: 75). As the remainder of the book sets out in more detail, this conception of peace operations is currently in the ascendancy and is closely associated with the expansion of the roles and responsibilities granted to peacekeepers.

Despite this, however, MacQueen (2006: 11) argues that peace operations remain 'largely Westphalian' because they are concerned principally with regulating a state-based international system. Our view is that an increasing number of peace operations are concerned primarily with the internal nature and composition of states themselves rather than with relations *between* states. However, MacQueen is partly right, because liberal peace theory tells us that democratization and liberalization within states is a necessary precursor to peace between them.

Although ascendant and increasingly evident in the work of the UN and other international organizations, the post-Westphalian conception remains controversial and is opposed by defenders of the Westphalian order, most of whom are found in the global South. The Chinese government, for instance, has argued that Deng's account of sovereignty is merely a thinly veiled attempt to legitimize great power interference in the domestic affairs of sovereigns, while Cuba detected an attempt 'to forcibly impose certain ideological conceptions of human rights on a number of countries, chiefly, though not exclusively, in the Third World' (in Deng et al. 1996: 12). This debate, between advocates of Westphalian sovereignty and proponents of the new post-Westphalian approach, underpins many contemporary arguments about the function and purpose of peace operations, including strengthening the UN's capacity to deploy peacekeepers, funding issues, the protection of civilians, the use of force, the relationship between troop contributors and the Security Council, the role of regional organizations and coalitions of the willing, the relationship between peace operations and human rights, the monitoring of elections, the most appropriate path to economic reconstruction, the meaning of and necessity for host state consent, and the indicators of success and failure.

As we mentioned earlier, the post-Westphalian conception has become more popular since the end of the Cold War. In their design, most contemporary peace operations go well beyond the parameters set out by the Westphalian conception and interfere in many aspects of domestic political life. As a result, peace operations tend to be larger and more complex than in the past (Durch and Berkman 2006: 12). What is more, in 2005, the UN General Assembly formally endorsed the idea that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide and mass killing and that, when they failed to do so, this responsibility transferred to the UN (see Evans 2008; Bellamy 2009). It is important, however, to bear in mind that the Westphalian account continues to hold sway among many post-colonial states, which fear that the new approach erodes their right to determine their own path and opens the door to great power interference in their domestic affairs. A useful way of conceptualizing the debate is to follow former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's caricature of it as a struggle between two conceptions of sovereignty, each of which protects certain values worth preserving (see box 1.8).

#### 1.4 Conclusion

It is important to recognize the concepts and theories that inform the way we understand peace operations and their relationship with world politics more generally. Without this understanding, we are likely to overlook the way in which our unspoken theories and assumptions determine what we think is important and the way that the theory and practice of peace operations is informed by certain political commitments. Although often insight-

**Box 1.8 Kofi Annan: two conceptions of sovereignty**

In reality, this 'old orthodoxy' [traditional sovereignty] was never absolute. The Charter, after all, was issued in the name of the 'the peoples', not the governments, of the United Nations. Its aim is not only to preserve international peace – vitally important though that is – but also 'to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person'. The Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power... Can we really afford to let each state be the judge of its own right, or duty, to intervene in another state's internal conflict? If we do, will we not be forced to legitimise Hitler's championship of the Sudeten Germans, or Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? (Annan 1998a)

To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask... in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?

To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when States and groups of States can take military action outside the established mechanisms for enforcing international law, one might ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents, and in what circumstances? (Annan 1999d)

ful, discussions of peace operations that are not open about their own theoretical and political preferences exclude potentially valuable insights and perspectives. This leads to partial explanations that overlook a potentially rich and diverse range of alternative perspectives, which, in turn, inhibits rather than enlightens our understanding of peace operations. It is important to scrutinize our theoretical assumptions, to understand which level or unit of analysis we are operating at, and to remain curious about the perspectives, interests and values that are being left out. Until very recently, one of the most obscured perspectives in this field of study was that of the *subjects* of peace operations – the very people that the peacekeepers are ostensibly helping.

Today's world is shaped by contemporary globalization, which has facilitated important challenges to the Westphalian order. Events that happen in one part of the world invariably impact on others – be that through flows of refugees and migrants, trade (both legal and illicit) or communication. Such connectivity has given rise to the argument that international society as a whole has a 'responsibility to protect' individuals from grave breaches of their human rights in situations where their own state is either unwilling or unable to do so. This has prompted a radical rethinking of the meaning of

sovereignty to include responsibility and has prompted protracted and ongoing debate about the proper role of peace operations in world politics. Many states and other actors continue to argue that the principles of Westphalian international society ought to be privileged and should temper the commitment to liberal peace that informs most contemporary peace operations. Stable peace, they argue, can only be achieved by creating spaces and institutions for states to resolve their differences peacefully on the basis of consent and mutual respect for the principle of non-interference. What goes on inside states should not concern peace operations unless their hosts invite them.

In contrast, the post-Westphalian view holds that states have responsibilities to their citizens, instability in one state is likely to destabilize others, and individual states are accountable to international society. International society, in turn, has a responsibility to assist and – if needs be – force states to fulfil their responsibilities. Because liberal democratic polities tend to be better at protecting their citizens from genocide and mass killing, as well as settling their disputes with other democracies without resorting to war, peace operations should be in the business of rebuilding war-shattered societies along liberal democratic lines. Only in this way can stable peace be assured, because the Westphalian conception does nothing to tackle the underlying causes of war, such as injustice, human rights abuse and poverty. Although the post-Westphalian conception is certainly in the ascendancy, it remains controversial, with the result that the place of peace operations in world politics and its future trajectory remains contested, inconsistent, unpredictable and uncertain.

Having set out some of the basic parameters for the study of peace operations, chapter 2 explores who the peacekeepers are, which institutions and ideas guide what they do, and how they are in the process of changing in the contemporary world.